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The evolution of governance structures in a polycentric system

In: Handbook of Behavioural Economics and Smart Decision-Making

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  • Edward McPhail
  • Vlad Tarko

Abstract

This Handbook is a unique and original contribution of over thirty chapters on behavioural economics, examining and addressing an important stream of research where the starting assumption is that decision-makers are for the most part relatively smart or rational. This particular approach is in contrast to a theme running through much contemporary work where individuals’ behaviour is deemed irrational, biased, and error-prone, often due to how people are hardwired. In the smart people approach, where errors or biases occur and when social dilemmas arise, more often than not, improving the decision-making environment can repair these problems without hijacking or manipulating the preferences of decision-makers. This book covers a wide-range of themes from micro to macro, including various sub-disciplines within economics such as economic psychology, heuristics, fast and slow-thinking, neuroeconomics, experiments, the capabilities approach, institutional economics, methodology, nudging, ethics, and public policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Edward McPhail & Vlad Tarko, 2017. "The evolution of governance structures in a polycentric system," Chapters, in: Morris Altman (ed.), Handbook of Behavioural Economics and Smart Decision-Making, chapter 16, pages 290-314, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:15532_16
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    References listed on IDEAS

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