IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Human capital investment and globalization in extortionary states

  • Andersson, Fredrik
  • Konrad, Kai A.

This paper considers education investment and public education subsidies in closed and open economies with an extortionary government. The extortionary government in a closed economy has incentives to subsidize education in order to overcome a hold-up problem of time consistent taxation, similar to benevolent governments. The two types of government differ in their education policies if highly productive labor is fully mobile. Extortionary governments’ incentives for education subsidies vanish and they even have an incentive to prevent individuals from mobility increasing education investment. Tax competition therefore reduces hold-up problems of time consistent extortionary taxation, but also introduces incentives that reduce workers’ utility.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V76-44RNK3N-2/2/820c1b38e67b3d726023426355e1d28d
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 87 (2003)
Issue (Month): 7-8 (August)
Pages: 1539-1555

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:87:y:2003:i:7-8:p:1539-1555
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Hans-Werner Sinn, 1996. "Social insurance, incentives and risk taking," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 259-280, July.
  2. Martin C. McGuire & Mancur Olson Jr., 1996. "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 72-96, March.
  3. Jeremy Edwards & Michael Keen, 1994. "Tax competition and Leviathon," IFS Working Papers W94/07, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  4. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1982. "Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 213-240, March.
  5. Boadway, R. & Marchand, M., 1990. "The use of public expenditures for distributive purposes," CORE Discussion Papers 1990066, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  6. Mark Gradstein, 1999. "An Economic Rationale for Public Education: The Value of Commitment," CESifo Working Paper Series 209, CESifo Group Munich.
  7. Moshe Justman & Jacques-Francois Thisse, 2000. "Local Public Funding of Higher Education When Skilled Labor is Imperfectly Mobile," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 247-258, May.
  8. Andersson, Fredrik & Konrad, Kai A., 2002. "Human capital investment and globalization in extortionary states
    [Humankapitalinvestitionen und Globalisierung in Ausbeutungsstaaten]
    ," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance FS IV 02-01, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  9. Eaton, Jonathan & Rosen, Harvey S, 1980. "Taxation, Human Capital, and Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(4), pages 705-15, September.
  10. Robin Boadway & Nicolas Marceau & Maurice Marchand, 1992. "Investment in Education and the Time Inconsistency of Redistributive Tax Policy," Working Papers 860, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  11. Poutvaara, Panu & Kanniainen, Vesa, 2000. "Why invest in your neighbor? Social contract on educational investment," Munich Reprints in Economics 19797, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  12. Poutvaara, Panu, 1999. "Federation's alternative tax constitutions and risky education," ZEW Discussion Papers 99-42, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  13. Kydland, Finn E. & Prescott, Edward C., 1980. "Dynamic optimal taxation, rational expectations and optimal control," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 79-91, May.
  14. Andersson, Fredrik & Konrad, Kai A., 2001. "Globalization and Human Capital Formation," IZA Discussion Papers 245, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  15. David E. Wildasin, 2000. "Factor Mobility and Fiscal Policy in the EU: Policy Issues and Analytical Approaches," CESifo Working Paper Series 344, CESifo Group Munich.
  16. Konrad, Kai A., 2001. "Privacy and time-consistent optimal labor income taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 503-519, March.
  17. Stern, Nicholas, 1982. "Optimum taxation with errors in administration," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 181-211, March.
  18. Varian, Hal R., 1980. "Redistributive taxation as social insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 49-68, August.
  19. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521027922 is not listed on IDEAS
  20. Kehoe, Patrick J, 1989. "Policy Cooperation among Benevolent Governments May Be Undesirable," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(2), pages 289-96, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:87:y:2003:i:7-8:p:1539-1555. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.