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Privacy, time consistent optimal labor income taxation and education policy

Author

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  • Konrad, Kai A.

    () (Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance)

Abstract

Incomplete information is a commitment device for time consistency problems. In the contextof time consistent labor income taxation privacy can lead to a Pareto superior outcome and increases the effectiveness of public education as a second best policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Konrad, Kai A., 1999. "Privacy, time consistent optimal labor income taxation and education policy," IZA Discussion Papers 82, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp82
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    13. Stern, Nicholas, 1982. "Optimum taxation with errors in administration," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 181-211, March.
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    17. Kotlikoff, Laurence J & Persson, Torsten & Svensson, Lars E O, 1988. "Social Contracts as Assets: A Possible Solution to the Time-Consistency Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 662-677, September.
    18. Boadway, Robin & Marceau, Nicolas & Marchand, Maurice, 1996. "Investment in Education and the Time Inconsistency of Redistributive Tax Policy," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 63(250), pages 171-189, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Panu Poutvaara, 2006. "On the political economy of social security and public education," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 19(2), pages 345-365, June.
    2. Dan Anderberg & Carlo Perroni, "undated". "Renegotiation of Social Contracts by Majority Rule," EPRU Working Paper Series 00-15, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    3. Fertig, Michael & Schmidt, Christoph M., 2000. "Discretionary Measures of Active Labor Market Policy: The German Employment Promotion Reform in Perspective," IZA Discussion Papers 182, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    4. Poutvaara, Panu, 1999. "Federation's alternative tax constitutions and risky education," ZEW Discussion Papers 99-42, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    5. Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Olsen, Trond E. & Straume, Odd Rune, 2005. "Access regulation and cross-border mergers: Is international coordination beneficial?," Working Papers in Economics 13/05, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
    6. Amihai Glazer, 2008. "Crowding Out Wasteful Activities by Wasteful Activities," Working Papers 080908, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
    7. Panu Poutvaara, 2006. "On the political economy of social security and public education," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 19(2), pages 345-365, June.
    8. Amihai Glazer & Mark Gradstein, 2001. "Appropriation, Human Capital, and Mandatory Schooling," CESifo Working Paper Series 538, CESifo Group Munich.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Privacy; time consistent income taxation; commitment;

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies

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