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Globalization and Risky Human-Capital Investment

Listed author(s):
  • Andersson, Fredrik
  • Konrad, Kai A

Globalization is supposed to increase the mobility of highly skilled labor and to reduce governments' scope for redistribution. We show that this increases the private incentives for education and may decrease, but may also increase, the government's incentives to provide education subsidies in a framework in which education investment is risky. Globalization shifts the cost of these subsidies to the less skilled. For the welfare implications of globalization the availability of private insurance is crucial. Welfare unambiguously increases if such markets work. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Article provided by Springer & International Institute of Public Finance in its journal International Tax and Public Finance.

Volume (Year): 10 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
Pages: 211-228

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Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:10:y:2003:i:3:p:211-28
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  1. Steven Shavell, 1979. "On Moral Hazard and Insurance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 93(4), pages 541-562.
  2. Panu Poutvaara, 2000. "Education, Mobility of Labour and Tax Competition," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 7(6), pages 699-719, December.
  3. Justman, M. & Thisse, J.-F., "undated". "Implications of the mobility of skilled labor for local public funding of higher education," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1296, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Hans-Werner Sinn, 1996. "Social insurance, incentives and risk taking," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 3(3), pages 259-280, July.
  5. Hagen, K.P. & Osmundsen, P. & Schjelderup, G., 1995. "Personal Income Taxation and Welfare Appropriation in an Open Economy," Papers 15/95, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
  6. Poutvaara, Panu & Kanniainen, Vesa, 2000. "Why invest in your neighbor? Social contract on educational investment," Munich Reprints in Economics 19797, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  7. Panu Poutvaara, 2002. "Investment in Education and Redistributive Taxation without Precommitment," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 59(2), pages 177-177, May.
  8. David E. Wildasin, 2000. "Labor-Market Integration, Investment in Risky Human Capital, and Fiscal Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 73-95, March.
  9. David M. Cutler & Jonathan Gruber, 1995. "Does Public Insurance Crowd Out Private Insurance?," NBER Working Papers 5082, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Robin W. Boadway & Maurice Marchand, 1990. "The Use of Public Expenditure for Distributive Purpose," Working Papers 796, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  11. Konrad, Kai A., 2001. "Privacy and time-consistent optimal labor income taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 503-519, March.
  12. Timothy Besley, 1995. "Nonmarket Institutions for Credit and Risk Sharing in Low-Income Countries," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(3), pages 115-127, Summer.
  13. Cullen, Julie Berry & Gruber, Jonathan, 2000. "Does Unemployment Insurance Crowd Out Spousal Labor Supply?," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 546-572, July.
  14. Horrell, Sara & Oxley, Deborah, 2000. "Work and prudence: Household responses to income variation in nineteenth-century Britain," European Review of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(01), pages 27-57, April.
  15. Boadway, R. & Marchand, M., "undated". "The use of public expenditures for redistributive purposes," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1131, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  16. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1982. "Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 213-240, March.
  17. Patrick J. Kehoe, 1989. "Policy Cooperation Among Benevolent Governments May Be Undesirable," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(2), pages 289-296.
  18. Wildasin, David E. & Wilson, John Douglas, 1996. "Imperfect mobility and local government behaviour in an overlapping-generations model," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 177-198, May.
  19. Varian, Hal R., 1980. "Redistributive taxation as social insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 49-68, August.
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