Nonmarket Institutions for Credit and Risk Sharing in Low-Income Countries
The design credit and risk institutions in low-income countries provides one of the most exciting testing grounds for theories of contracting with imperfect information and limited enforcement. This paper reviews some of the recent literature, with a special focus on nonmarket institutions that cope with risk and provide credit. This literature attempts to bring together insights from economic theory, especially information economics, contract theory, and mechanism design theory. However, it is also applied, being motivated by the circumstance of the poor countries that their authors have visited and studied.
Volume (Year): 9 (1995)
Issue (Month): 3 (Summer)
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Besley, T. & Coate, S., 1991.
"Group Lending, Repayment Incentives And Social Collateral,"
152, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Development Studies.
- Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1995. "Group lending, repayment incentives and social collateral," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 1-18, February.
- Rosenzweig, Mark R, 1988.
"Risk, Implicit Contracts and the Family in Rural Areas of Low-income Countries,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(393), pages 1148-70, December.
- Rosenzweig, Mark R., 1986. "Risk, Implicit Contracts and the Family in Rural Areas of Low-Income Countries," Bulletins 7518, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
- Townsend, Robert M, 1982. "Optimal Multiperiod Contracts and the Gain from Enduring Relationships under Private Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(6), pages 1166-86, December.
- Eswaran, Mukesh & Kotwal, Ashok, 1989. "Credit as insurance in agrarian economies," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 37-53, July.
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