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Consommation, partage de risque et assurance informelle : développements théoriques et tests empiriques récents

  • Dubois, Pierre

    (Université de Toulouse (INRA, IDEI))

The study of optimal risk sharing, either at the aggregate level or at the village level, has been deeply renewed by the contributions of empirical papers mostly rejecting the existing theories. The rejection of the Permanent Income Hypothesis and of the Complete Markets Hypothesis led to model directly the very imperfections of markets in order to elaborate theories consistent with the consumption profiles observed and the degree of risk sharing reached. In this survey of the literature, we expose these economic theories of risk sharing in consumption and the informal insurance mechanisms according to the markets completeness. The sources of market imperfections come from informational asymmetries or limited commitment. We present also the different methods employed to test these different theories within the most significant recent empirical studies. L’étude du partage optimal des risques dans une économie, soit au niveau agrégé, soit au niveau d’un village, a été profondément renouvelée par les résultats des articles empiriques rejetant pour la plupart les théories existantes. Le rejet de l’hypothèse de revenu permanent et de l’assurance complète a conduit à modéliser les imperfections des marchés afin d’élaborer des théories compatibles avec les profils de consommation observés et le degré de partage de risque obtenu. Dans cette revue de littérature, nous exposons ces théories économiques de partage de risque en consommation et les mécanismes « informels » d’assurance en fonction de la complétude des marchés. Les diverses sources d’imperfections peuvent provenir de problèmes d’asymétries d’information ou de limites à l’engagement. Nous présentons aussi les différentes méthodes employées pour tester ces diverses théories parmi les études empiriques récentes les plus significatives.

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Article provided by Société Canadienne de Science Economique in its journal L'Actualité économique.

Volume (Year): 78 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 (Mars)
Pages: 115-149

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Handle: RePEc:ris:actuec:v:78:y:2002:i:1:p:115-149
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