Income Fluctuations and Asymmetric Information: An Example of the Repeated Principal Agent Problem
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- Thomas, Jonathan & Worrall, Tim, 1990. "Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 367-390, August.
References listed on IDEAS
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2010-12-18 (Contract Theory and Applications)
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