Markov-Perfect Risk Sharing, Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment
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DOI: 10.20955/wp.2011.030
Note: Original title: Moral hazard and lack of commitment in dynamic economies
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- Karaivanov, Alexander K. & Martin, Fernando M., 2018. "Markov-perfect risk sharing, moral hazard and limited commitment," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 1-23.
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Cited by:
- Alexander Karaivanov & Fernando Martin, 2015.
"Dynamic Optimal Insurance and Lack of Commitment,"
Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 18(2), pages 287-305, April.
- Alexander K. Karaivanov & Fernando M. Martin, 2007. "Dynamic Optimal Insurance and Lack of Commitment," Discussion Papers dp07-22, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
- Fernando M. Martin & Alexander Karaivanov, 2007. "Dynamic Optimal Insurance and Lack of Commitment," 2007 Meeting Papers 793, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Alexander K. Karaivanov & Fernando M. Martin, 2011. "Dynamic optimal insurance and lack of commitment," Working Papers 2011-029, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
- Camilo Hern'andez & Dylan Possamai, 2023. "Time-inconsistent contract theory," Papers 2303.01601, arXiv.org.
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More about this item
Keywords
Markov-perfect equilibrium; risk-sharing; limited commitment; moral hazard; consumption smoothing;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
- E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CBA-2011-11-01 (Central Banking)
- NEP-CTA-2011-11-01 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-DGE-2011-11-01 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-IAS-2011-11-01 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2011-11-01 (Microeconomics)
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