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Consumption Risk Sharing with Private Information and Limited Enforcement

Author

Listed:
  • Tobias Broer

    (Stockholm University)

  • Marek Kapicka

    (CERGE-EI)

  • Paul Klein

    (Simon Fraser University)

Abstract

We study consumption risk sharing when individual income shocks are persistent and not publicly observable, and individuals can default on contracts at the price of financial autarky. We find that, in contrast to a model where the only friction is limited enforcement, our model has observable implications that are similar to those of an Aiyagari (1994) self-insurance model and therefore broadly consistent with empirical observations. However, some of the implied effects of changes in policy or the economic environment are noticeably different in our model compared to self-insurance. (Copyright: Elsevier)

Suggested Citation

  • Tobias Broer & Marek Kapicka & Paul Klein, 2017. "Consumption Risk Sharing with Private Information and Limited Enforcement," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 23, pages 170-190, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:red:issued:16-83
    DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2016.10.001
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    Cited by:

    1. Smith, Anthony Jr. & Wang, Cheng, 2006. "Dynamic credit relationships in general equilibrium," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(4), pages 847-877, May.
    2. Karaivanov, Alexander K. & Martin, Fernando M., 2018. "Markov-perfect risk sharing, moral hazard and limited commitment," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 1-23.
    3. Orazio Attanasio & Sonya Krutikova, 2020. "Consumption Insurance in Networks with Asymmetric Information," NBER Working Papers 27290, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Ethan Ligon & Laura Schechter, 2020. "Structural Experimentation to Distinguish between Models of Risk Sharing with Frictions in Rural Paraguay," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 69(1), pages 1-50.
    5. Philipp Renner & Simon Scheidegger, 2017. "Machine learning for dynamic incentive problems," Working Papers 203620397, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    6. Denderski, Piotr & Stoltenberg, Christian A., 2020. "Risk sharing with private and public information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    7. Alexander Ludwig & Matthias Schön, 2018. "Endogenous Grids in Higher Dimensions: Delaunay Interpolation and Hybrid Methods," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 51(3), pages 463-492, March.
    8. Broer, Tobias, 2020. "Consumption insurance over the business cycle," CEPR Discussion Papers 14579, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Charles Brendon, 2011. "Applying perturbation analysis to dynamic optimal tax problems," Economics Series Working Papers 581, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    10. Alex Bloedel & R. Vijay Krishna & Oksana Leukhina, 2018. "Insurance and Inequality with Persistent Private Information," Working Papers 2018-020, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, revised 11 Aug 2024.
    11. Li, Zhimin & Ligon, Ethan, 2020. "Inferring informal risk-sharing regimes: Evidence from rural Tanzania," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 941-955.
    12. Jean Guillaume Forand & Jan Zapal, 2017. "The Demand and Supply of Favours in Dynamic Relationships," Working Papers 1705, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2017.
    13. Joydeep Bhattacharya & Monisankar Bishnu & Min Wang, 2023. "Credit Markets with time-inconsistent agents and strategic loan default," Discussion Papers 23-01, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
    14. Christian A. Stoltenberg & Swapnil Singh, 2020. "Consumption insurance with advance information," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(2), pages 671-711, May.
    15. Alexander Karaivanov, 2021. "Blockchains, Collateral and Financial Contracts," Discussion Papers dp21-03, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
    16. Eduardo Zilberman & Vinicius Carrasco & Pedro Hemsley, 2019. "Risk sharing contracts with private information and one-sided commitment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(1), pages 53-81, July.
    17. Swapnil Singh & Christian A. Stoltenbergz, 2018. "How Much Do Households Really Know About Their Future Income?," Bank of Lithuania Working Paper Series 55, Bank of Lithuania.
    18. Piotr Denderski & Christian Stoltenberg, 2015. "On Positive Value of Information in Risk Sharing," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 15-074/VI, Tinbergen Institute.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Consumption insurance; Private information; Limited enforcement;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook

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