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The wrong shape of insurance? What cross-sectional distributions tell us about models of consumption-smoothing

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  • Broer, Tobias

Abstract

This paper shows how two standard models of consumption risk-sharing - self-insurance through borrowing and saving and limited commitment to insurance contracts - replicate similarly well the standard, second-moment measures of insurance observed in US micro-data. A non-parametric analysis, however, reveals strongly contrasting and counterfactual joint distributions of consumption, income and wealth. Method of moments estimation shows how measurement error in consumption eliminates excessive skewness and concentration of consumption growth. Moreover, counterfactual non-linearities disappear at high estimated risk-aversion under self-insurance, but are a robust feature of limited commitment. Its "shape of insurance" thus argues strongly in favour of the self-insurance model.

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  • Broer, Tobias, 2011. "The wrong shape of insurance? What cross-sectional distributions tell us about models of consumption-smoothing," CEPR Discussion Papers 8701, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8701
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    Cited by:

    1. Xavier Mateos-Planas & Giulio Seccia, 2013. "Consumer Default with Complete Markets: Default-based Pricing and Finite Punishment," Working Papers 711, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    2. Zhang, Yuzhe, 2013. "Characterization of a risk sharing contract with one-sided commitment," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 794-809.
    3. Lancia, Francesco & Russo, Alessia & Worrall, Tim S, 2020. "Optimal Sustainable Intergenerational Insurance," CEPR Discussion Papers 15540, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Árpád Ábrahám & Sarolta Laczó, 2018. "Efficient Risk Sharing with Limited Commitment and Storage," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 85(3), pages 1389-1424.
    5. Thomas, Jonathan P. & Worrall, Tim, 2018. "Dynamic relational contracts under complete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 624-651.
    6. Tessa Bold & Tobias Broer, 2021. "Risk Sharing in Village Economies Revisited [Efficient Risk Sharing with Limited Commitment and Storage]," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 19(6), pages 3207-3248.
    7. Röhrs, Sigrid & Winter, Christoph, 2015. "Public versus private provision of liquidity: Is there a trade-off?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 314-339.
    8. Tobias Broer & Marek Kapicka & Paul Klein, 2017. "Consumption Risk Sharing with Private Information and Limited Enforcement," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 23, pages 170-190, January.
    9. Broer, Tobias, 2014. "Domestic or global imbalances? Rising income risk and the fall in the US current account," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 47-67.
    10. Tobias Broer & Tessa Bold, 2015. "Risk-Sharing in Village Economies Revisited," 2015 Meeting Papers 1232, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    11. Xavier Mateos-Planas & Giulio Seccia, 2013. "Consumer Default with Complete Markets: Default-based Pricing and Finite Punishment," Working Papers 711, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    12. Thomas, Jonathan P. & Worrall, Tim, 2014. "Dynamic Relational Contracts under Complete Information," 2007 Annual Meeting, July 29-August 1, 2007, Portland, Oregon TN 2015-47, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    13. Christian A. Stoltenberg & Swapnil Singh, 2020. "Consumption insurance with advance information," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(2), pages 671-711, May.
    14. Wöhrmüller, Stefan, 2022. "Consumption Insurance and Credit Shocks," VfS Annual Conference 2022 (Basel): Big Data in Economics 264088, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    15. Denderski, Piotr & Stoltenberg, Christian A., 2020. "Risk sharing with private and public information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    16. Martin Ellison & Charles Brendon, 2015. "Time-Consistent Institutional Design," 2015 Meeting Papers 495, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    17. Xavier Mateos-Planas & Giulio Seccia, 2014. "Consumer default with complete markets: default-based pricing and finite punishment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(3), pages 549-583, August.
    18. Etheridge, Ben, 2015. "A test of the household income process using consumption and wealth data," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 129-157.
    19. Broer, Tobias, 2020. "Consumption insurance over the business cycle," CEPR Discussion Papers 14579, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    20. Swapnil Singh & Christian A. Stoltenbergz, 2018. "How Much Do Households Really Know About Their Future Income?," Bank of Lithuania Working Paper Series 55, Bank of Lithuania.
    21. Dirk Krueger & Harald Uhlig, 2024. "Neoclassical Growth with Limited Commitment," PIER Working Paper Archive 22-023, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    22. Swapnil Singh, 2018. "Public insurance of married versus single households in the US: trends and welfare consequences," Bank of Lithuania Working Paper Series 54, Bank of Lithuania.
    23. Tobias Broer & Marek Kapicka & Paul Klein, 2017. "Consumption Risk Sharing with Private Information and Limited Enforcement," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 23, pages 170-190, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Limited commitment; Risk sharing; Wealth and consumption distribution;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
    • E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy

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