IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/red/sed011/247.html

Consumption risk sharing under private information when earnings are persistent

Author

Listed:
  • Paul Klein

    (Southampton)

  • Marek Kapicka

    (UCSB)

Abstract

In this paper we quantitatively investigate the implications of a model of consumption risk sharing where infinitely-lived households are subject to exogenous idiosyncratic shocks to their earnings, and where the realization of these shocks are private information. Our theoretical contribution relative to the existing literature is to allow for persistence in earnings. This creates some formidable obstacles to recursive computation of the optimal contract. If the earnings process follows a Markov chain whose state space has N elements, the state space for the optimal dynamic contracting problem has N continuous dimensions and is a nontrivial subset W in RN . Such a problem is prohibitively complex, first because of the dimension of the dimensionality of the state space and, second, because it is difficult to solve for W itself.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Klein & Marek Kapicka, 2011. "Consumption risk sharing under private information when earnings are persistent," 2011 Meeting Papers 247, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  • Handle: RePEc:red:sed011:247
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://red-files-public.s3.amazonaws.com/meetpapers/2011/paper_247.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Alex Bloedel & R. Vijay Krishna & Oksana Leukhina, 2018. "Insurance and Inequality with Persistent Private Information," Working Papers 2018-020, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, revised 11 Aug 2024.
    2. Ethan Ligon & Laura Schechter, 2020. "Structural Experimentation to Distinguish between Models of Risk Sharing with Frictions in Rural Paraguay," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 69(1), pages 1-50.
    3. Alexander W. Bloedel & R. Vijay Krishna & Oksana Leukhina, 2025. "Insurance and Inequality With Persistent Private Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 93(3), pages 821-857, May.
    4. Orazio Attanasio & Sonya Krutikova, 2020. "Consumption Insurance in Networks with Asymmetric Information," NBER Working Papers 27290, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Li, Zhimin & Ligon, Ethan, 2020. "Inferring informal risk-sharing regimes: Evidence from rural Tanzania," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 941-955.
    6. Jean Guillaume Forand & Jan Zapal, 2017. "The Demand and Supply of Favours in Dynamic Relationships," Working Papers 1705, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2017.
    7. Joydeep Bhattacharya & Monisankar Bishnu & Min Wang, 2024. "Credit Markets with Time‐Inconsistent Agents and Strategic Loan Default," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 56(7), pages 1803-1831, October.
    8. Christian A. Stoltenberg & Swapnil Singh, 2020. "Consumption insurance with advance information," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(2), pages 671-711, May.
    9. Smith, Anthony Jr. & Wang, Cheng, 2006. "Dynamic credit relationships in general equilibrium," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(4), pages 847-877, May.
    10. Philipp Renner & Simon Scheidegger, 2017. "Machine learning for dynamic incentive problems," Working Papers 203620397, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    11. Denderski, Piotr & Stoltenberg, Christian A., 2020. "Risk sharing with private and public information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    12. Alexander Ludwig & Matthias Schön, 2018. "Endogenous Grids in Higher Dimensions: Delaunay Interpolation and Hybrid Methods," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 51(3), pages 463-492, March.
    13. Alexander Karaivanov, 2021. "Blockchains, Collateral and Financial Contracts," Discussion Papers dp21-03, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
    14. Eduardo Zilberman & Vinicius Carrasco & Pedro Hemsley, 2019. "Risk sharing contracts with private information and one-sided commitment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(1), pages 53-81, July.
    15. Karaivanov, Alexander K. & Martin, Fernando M., 2018. "Markov-perfect risk sharing, moral hazard and limited commitment," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 1-23.
    16. Broer, Tobias, 2020. "Consumption insurance over the business cycle," CEPR Discussion Papers 14579, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Charles Brendon, 2011. "Applying perturbation analysis to dynamic optimal tax problems," Economics Series Working Papers 581, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    18. Swapnil Singh & Christian A. Stoltenbergz, 2018. "How Much Do Households Really Know About Their Future Income?," Bank of Lithuania Working Paper Series 55, Bank of Lithuania.
    19. Piotr Denderski & Christian Stoltenberg, 2015. "On Positive Value of Information in Risk Sharing," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 15-074/VI, Tinbergen Institute.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:red:sed011:247. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Christian Zimmermann (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sedddea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.