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Dynamic credit relationships in general equilibrium

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  • Smith, Anthony Jr.
  • Wang, Cheng

Abstract

We construct a general equilibrium model with private information in which borrowers and lenders enter into long-term dynamic credit relationships. Each new generation of ex ante identical individuals is divided in equilibrium into workers and entrepreneurs. Workers save through financial intermediaries in the form of interest-bearing deposits and supply labor to entrepreneurs in a competitive labor market. Entrepreneurs borrow from financial intermediaries to finance projects which produce privately observed sequences of random returns. Each financial intermediary holds deposits from a large number of workers and operates a portfolio of dynamic contracts with different credit positions. We calibrate the model to the U.S. economy and find that dynamic contracting is very effective at mitigating the effects of private information. Moreover, restricting borrowers and lenders to use static (one-period) contracts with a costly monitoring technology has adverse effects both on the level of aggregate econonmic activity and on individual welfare unless monitoring costs are very small. Finally, the optimal provision of intertemporal incentives leads to increasing consumption inequality over time within generational cohorts as in U.S. data.
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  • Smith, Anthony Jr. & Wang, Cheng, 2006. "Dynamic credit relationships in general equilibrium," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(4), pages 847-877, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:53:y:2006:i:4:p:847-877
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    1. Jeremy Greenwood & Juan M. Sanchez & Cheng Wang, 2010. "Financing Development: The Role of Information Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1875-1891, September.
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    7. Martin Andreasen & Marcelo Ferman & Pawel Zabczyk, 2013. "The Business Cycle Implications of Banks' Maturity Transformation," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 16(4), pages 581-600, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Wang, Cheng, 2011. "Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 74-110, January.
    2. Stephane Verani, 2018. "Aggregate Consequences of Dynamic Credit Relationships," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 29, pages 44-67, July.
    3. Jeremy Greenwood & Juan M. Sanchez & Cheng Wang, 2010. "Financing Development: The Role of Information Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1875-1891, September.
    4. Li, Shuyun May, 2013. "Optimal lending contracts with long run borrowing constraints," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(5), pages 964-983.
    5. Shuyun May Li, 2009. "Optimal Lending Contracts with Asymmetric Information and Two-sided Limited Commitment or Impatient Entrepreneur," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1065, The University of Melbourne.
    6. Martin Andreasen & Marcelo Ferman & Pawel Zabczyk, 2013. "The Business Cycle Implications of Banks' Maturity Transformation," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 16(4), pages 581-600, October.
    7. Shuyun May Li, 2009. "Optimal Lending Contracts with Long Run Borrowing Constraints," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1084, The University of Melbourne.
    8. Hachem, Kinda, 2011. "Relationship lending and the transmission of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(6), pages 590-600.
    9. Storesletten, Kjetil & Telmer, Christopher I. & Yaron, Amir, 2004. "Consumption and risk sharing over the life cycle," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 609-633, April.
    10. Stephane Verani, 2018. "Aggregate Consequences of Dynamic Credit Relationships," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 29, pages 44-67, July.
    11. Till Gross & Stéphane Verani, 2012. "Financing Constraints, Firm Dynamics, and International Trade," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2012-68, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    12. Cesar Tamayo, 2015. "Investor protection and optimal contracts under risk aversion and costly state verification," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(3), pages 547-577, August.
    13. Jin, Yu, 2010. "Credit Termination and the Technology Bubbles," MPRA Paper 29010, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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