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Aggregate Consequences of Limited Contract Enforceability

  • Thomas Cooley
  • Ramon Marimon
  • Vincenzo Quadrini

We study a general equilibrium model in which entrepreneurs finance investment with optimal financial contracts. Because of enforceability problems, contracts are constrained efficient. We show that limited enforceability amplifies the impact of technological innovations on aggregate output. More generally, we show that lower enforceability of contracts will be associated with greater aggregate volatility. A key assumption for this result is that defaulting entrepreneurs are not excluded from the market.

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File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w10132.pdf
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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 10132.

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Date of creation: Dec 2003
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Publication status: published as Cooley, Thomas, Ramon Marimon and Vincenzo Quadrini. "Aggregate Consequences Of Limited Contract Enforceability," Journal of Political Economy, 2004, v112(4,Aug), 817-847.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10132
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