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Optimal Dynamic Lending Contracts with Imperfect Enforceability

Author

Listed:
  • Albuquerque, R.
  • Hopenhayn, H.A.

Abstract

In this paper we have developed a general model of borrowing constraints based on the idea of limited enforcement. I our model, borrowing constraints arise as part of the optimal borrowing and lending contract. Our model extends previous theories of borrowing and lending , such as Hart and Moore (1994) allowing for uncertainty and dynamic effects of the resulting credit constraints.

Suggested Citation

  • Albuquerque, R. & Hopenhayn, H.A., 1997. "Optimal Dynamic Lending Contracts with Imperfect Enforceability," RCER Working Papers 439, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  • Handle: RePEc:roc:rocher:439
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Cooley & Ramon Marimon & Vincenzo Quadrini, 2004. "Aggregate Consequences of Limited Contract Enforceability," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(4), pages 817-847, August.
    2. Sangeeta Pratap & Silvio Rendon, 2003. "Firm Investment in Imperfect Capital Markets: A Structural Estimation," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 6(3), pages 513-545, July.
    3. Caggese, Andrea, 2007. "Testing financing constraints on firm investment using variable capital," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(3), pages 683-723, December.
    4. Cyril Monnet & Erwan Quintin, 2005. "Optimal contracts in a dynamic costly state verification model," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(4), pages 867-885, November.
    5. Marco Cagetti & Mariacristina De Nardi, 2006. "Entrepreneurship, Frictions, and Wealth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(5), pages 835-870, October.
    6. Marco Cagetti & Mariacristina De Nardi, 2009. "Estate Taxation, Entrepreneurship, and Wealth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(1), pages 85-111, March.
    7. Christiano, Lawrence J. & Gust, Christopher & Roldos, Jorge, 2004. "Monetary policy in a financial crisis," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 64-103, November.
    8. Cagetti, Marco & De Nardi, Mariacristina, 2008. "Wealth Inequality: Data And Models," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(S2), pages 285-313, September.
    9. Jermann, Urban J. & Quadrini, Vincenzo, 2007. "Stock market boom and the productivity gains of the 1990s," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 413-432, March.
    10. Shuyun May Li, 2009. "Optimal Lending Contracts with Asymmetric Information and Two-sided Limited Commitment or Impatient Entrepreneur," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1065, The University of Melbourne.
    11. Thomas F. Cooley & Vincenzo Quadrini, 2001. "Financial Markets and Firm Dynamics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1286-1310, December.
    12. Césaire Assah Meh, 2002. "Entrepreneurial Risk, Credit Constraints, and the Corporate Income Tax: A Quantitative Exploration," Staff Working Papers 02-21, Bank of Canada.
    13. Marco Cagetti & Mariacristina De Nardi, 2004. "Taxation, entrepreneurship, and wealth," Staff Report 340, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    14. Carlos Carreira & Filipe Silva, 2010. "No Deep Pockets: Some Stylized Empirical Results On Firms' Financial Constraints," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4), pages 731-753, September.
    15. Shuyun May Li, 2008. "Costly External Finance, Reallocation, and Aggregate Productivity," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1044, The University of Melbourne.
    16. Quintin, Erwan, 2008. "Limited enforcement and the organization of production," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 1222-1245, September.
    17. Alexander Monge-Naranjo, 2008. "Limited Commitment, Firm Dynamics and Aggregate Fluctuations," 2008 Meeting Papers 964, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    18. Pratap, Sangeeta, 2003. "Do adjustment costs explain investment-cash flow insensitivity?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 27(11-12), pages 1993-2006, September.
    19. John D. Stiver, 2003. "Endogenous Financing and the Long Run Impact of Money Growth on Output and Prices," Working papers 2003-36, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    20. Christian Calmès, 2004. "Financial Market Imperfection, Overinvestment,and Speculative Precaution," Staff Working Papers 04-27, Bank of Canada.
    21. Gadi Barlevy, 1999. "Credit Market Frictions and the Reallocation Process," Discussion Papers 1251, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    22. Quadrini, Vincenzo, 2004. "Investment and liquidation in renegotiation-proof contracts with moral hazard," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 713-751, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    BANKING ; ENTERPRISES ; INVESTMENTS;

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage

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