The authors obtain a recursive formulation for a general class of contracting problems involving incentive constraints. These constraints make the corresponding maximization (sup)problems non recursive. Our approach consists of studying a recursive Lagrangian.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1998|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Badia Fiesolana, Via dei Roccettini, 9, 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) Italy|
Web page: http://www.eui.eu/ECO/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mele, Antonio, 2010.
"Repeated moral hazard and recursive Lagrangeans,"
21741, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Matthias Messner & Nicola Pavoni, 2016.
"On the Recursive Saddle Point Method,"
Dynamic Games and Applications,
Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 161-173, June.
- Nicola Pavoni & Ramon Marimon & Matthias Messner, 2005. "On the Recursive Saddle Point Method," 2005 Meeting Papers 294, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Matthias Messner & Nicola Pavoni, 2004. "On the Recursive Saddle Point Method," Working Papers 255, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Matthias Messner & Nicola Pavoni, 2004. "On the Recursive Saddle Point Method," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000050, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Albert Marcet & Thomas J. Sargent & Juha Seppala, 1996.
"Optimal taxation without state-contingent debt,"
Economics Working Papers
170, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Oct 2001.
- Narayana Kocherlakota, 2010.
"Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing Without Commitment,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
2053, David K. Levine.
- Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 1996. "Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(4), pages 595-609.
- Thomas, Jonathan & Worrall, Tim, 1990. "Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 367-390, August.
- Harold Cole & Felix Kubler, 2012.
"Recursive Contracts, Lotteries and Weakly Concave Pareto Sets,"
Review of Economic Dynamics,
Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 15(4), pages 479-500, October.
- Harold L. Cole & Felix Kubler, 2011. "Recursive Contracts, Lotteries and Weakly Concave Pareto Sets," NBER Working Papers 17064, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Harold Cole & Felix Kubler, 2010. "Recursive Contracts, Lotteries and Weakly Concave Pareto Sets," PIER Working Paper Archive 10-038, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Felix Kubler & Harold L. Cole, 2011. "Recursive Contracts, Lotteries and Weakly Concave Pareto Sets," 2011 Meeting Papers 59, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- David K. Backus & Patrick J. Kehoe & Finn E. Kydland, 1987.
"International real business cycles,"
426, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Patrick J. Kehoe & Fabrizio Perri, 2000.
"International business cycles with endogenous incomplete markets,"
265, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Patrick J. Kehoe & Fabrizio Perri, 2002. "International Business Cycles with Endogenous Incomplete Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(3), pages 907-928, May.
- Patrick J. Kehoe & Fabrizio Perri, 2000. "International Business Cycles with Endogenous Incomplete Markets," NBER Working Papers 7870, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Christopher Phelan & Ennio Stacchetti, 1999.
"Sequential equilibria in a Ramsey tax model,"
258, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Kletzer, Kenneth M. & Wright, Brian D., 1998.
"Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter,"
Center for International and Development Economics Research, Working Paper Series
qt4qg3c42v, Center for International and Development Economics Research, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Kenneth M. Kletzer and Brian D. Wright., 1998. "Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C98-100, University of California at Berkeley.
- Kenneth M. Kletzer & Brian D. Wright, 2000. "Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter," International Finance 0003004, EconWPA.
- Daron Acemoglu & Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2009.
"Power Fluctuations and Political Economy,"
NBER Working Papers
15400, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Roberto Chang, 1996. "Credible monetary policy with long-lived agents: recursive approaches," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 96-20, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- Eva Carceles-Poveda & Albert Marcet & Alexis Anagnostopoulos, 2008. "Equity Financing," 2008 Meeting Papers 954, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Andrés Velasco & Jess Benhabib & Aldo Rustichini, 2001. "Public spending and optimal taxes without commitment," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 6(3), pages 371-396.
- Levine, Paul & Currie, David, 1987. "The design of feedback rules in linear stochastic rational expectations models," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 1-28, March.
- Abreu, Dilip & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1990. "Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1041-63, September.
- Alvarez, Fernando & Stokey, Nancy L., 1998. "Dynamic Programming with Homogeneous Functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 167-189, September.
- Kydland, Finn E. & Prescott, Edward C., 1980. "Dynamic optimal taxation, rational expectations and optimal control," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 79-91, May.
- Árpád Ábrahám & Nicola Pavoni, 2005. "The Efficient Allocation of Consumption under Moral Hazard and Hidden Access to the Credit Market," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 3(2-3), pages 370-381, 04/05.
- Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
- German Rojas, 1993. "Optimal taxation in a stochastic growth model with public capital: Crowding-in effects and stabilization policy," Economics Working Papers 62, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Davide Debortoli & Ricardo Nunes, 2007. "Loose commitment," International Finance Discussion Papers 916, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco98/37. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Anne Banks)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.