Informal Insurance Arrangements in Village Economies
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- Ligon, Ethan & Thomas, Jonathan & Worrall, Tim, 1997. "Informal Insurance Arrangements in Village Economies," CUDARE Working Papers 198657, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsConsumption smoothing; Informal insurance; Limited commitment; Village economies;
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
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