Competitive Equilibria with Production and Limited Commitment
This paper studies a production economy with aggregate uncertainty where consumers have limited commitment on their financial liabilities. Markets are endogenously incomplete due to the fact that the borrowing constraints are determined endogenously. We first show that, if competitive financial intermediaries are allowed to set the borrowing limits, then the ones that prevent default will be an equilibrium outcome. The equilibrium allocations in this economy are not constrained efficient due to the fact that intermediaries do not internalize the adverse effects of capital on default incentives. We also isolate and quantifiy this new source of inefficiency by comparing the competitive equilibrium allocations to the constrained efficient ones both qualitatively and quantitatively. We tend to observe higher capital accumulation in the competitive equilibrium, implying that agents may enjoy higher (average) welfare in the long run than in the constrained efficient allocation.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2010|
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- Daniele Coen-Pirani & Eva Carceles-Poveda, .
"Shareholders Unanimity With Incomplete Markets,"
GSIA Working Papers
2005-E13, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
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