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Competitive Equilibria with Production and Limited Commitment

Author

Listed:
  • Arpad Abraham

    () (Department of Economics, University of Rochester)

  • Eva Carceles-Poveda

    () (Department of Economics, Stony Brook University)

Abstract

This paper studies a production economy with aggregate uncertainty where consumers have limited commitment on their financial liabilities. Markets are endogenously incomplete due to the fact that the borrowing constraints are determined endogenously. We first show that, if competitive financial intermediaries are allowed to set the borrowing limits, then the ones that prevent default will be an equilibrium outcome. The equilibrium allocations in this economy are not constrained efficient due to the fact that intermediaries do not internalize the adverse effects of capital on default incentives. We also isolate and quantifiy this new source of inefficiency by comparing the competitive equilibrium allocations to the constrained efficient ones both qualitatively and quantitatively. We tend to observe higher capital accumulation in the competitive equilibrium, implying that agents may enjoy higher (average) welfare in the long run than in the constrained efficient allocation.

Suggested Citation

  • Arpad Abraham & Eva Carceles-Poveda, 2010. "Competitive Equilibria with Production and Limited Commitment," Department of Economics Working Papers 10-04, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:nys:sunysb:10-04
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    File URL: http://www.stonybrook.edu/economics/research/papers/2010/risksharing.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2010
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Eva Carceles-Poveda & Daniele Coen-Pirani, 2009. "Shareholders' Unanimity With Incomplete Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 50(2), pages 577-606, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Competitive Equilibria with Production and Limited Commitment
      by Christian Zimmermann in NEP-DGE blog on 2011-02-14 02:44:14

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Tobias Broer & Marek Kapicka & Paul Klein, 2017. "Consumption Risk Sharing with Private Information and Limited Enforcement," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 23, pages 170-190, January.
    2. Bauducco, Sofia & Caprioli, Francesco, 2014. "Optimal fiscal policy in a small open economy with limited commitment," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 302-315.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Enforcement Constraints; Intermediation; Risk Sharing; Capital Accumulation.;

    JEL classification:

    • D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
    • E23 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Production

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