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Redistribution and Social Insurance

Author

Listed:
  • Mikhail Golosov
  • Maxim Troshkin
  • Aleh Tsyvinski

Abstract

We study optimal redistribution and insurance in a life-cycle economy with private idiosyncratic shocks. We characterize Pareto optima, show the forces determining optimal labor distortions, and derive closed form expressions for their limiting behavior. The labor distortions for high-productivity shocks are determined by the labor elasticity and the higher moments of the shock process; the labor distortions for low-productivity shocks are determined by the autocorrelation of the shock process, redistributive objectives, and past distortions. In a model calibrated using newly available estimates of idiosyncratic shocks, the labor distortions are U-shaped and the savings distortions generally increase in current earnings. (JEL D82, D91, H21, H23, I38, J22, J24)

Suggested Citation

  • Mikhail Golosov & Maxim Troshkin & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2016. "Redistribution and Social Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(2), pages 359-386, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:106:y:2016:i:2:p:359-86
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20111550
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity

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