Efficient allocations with hidden income and hidden storage
We consider an environment in which individuals receive income shocks that are unobservable to others and can privately store resources. We provide a simple characterization of the efficient allocation in cases in which the rate of return on storage is sufficiently high or, alternatively, in which the worst possible outcome is sufficiently dire. We show that, unlike in environments without unobservable storage, the symmetric efficient allocation is decentralizable through a competitive asset market in which individuals trade risk-free bonds among themselves.
|Date of creation:||1999|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Review of Economic Studies (Vol. 68, No. 3, July 2001, pp. 523-542)|
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