Non-exclusive Dynamic Contracts, Competition, and the Limits of Insurance
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- Pricila Maziero, 2009. "Non-Exclusive Dynamic Contracts, Competition, and the Limits of Insurance," 2009 Meeting Papers 509, Society for Economic Dynamics.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Laurence Ales & Pricila Maziero, 2009.
"Adverse Selection and Non-Exclusive Contracts,"
GSIA Working Papers
2010-E61, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
- Laurence Ales, 2009. "Adverse Selection and Non-exclusive Contracts," 2009 Meeting Papers 854, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Bertola, Giuseppe & Koeniger, Winfried, 2010.
"Public and Private Insurance with Costly Transactions,"
IZA Discussion Papers
5201, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Bertola, Giuseppe & Koeniger, Winfried, 2010. "Public and Private Insurance with Costly Transactions," CEPR Discussion Papers 8062, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ettore Panetti, 2017.
"A Theory of Bank Illiquidity and Default with Hidden Trades,"
Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(3), pages 1123-1157.
- Panetti, Ettore, 2011. "A Theory of Bank Illiquidity and Default with Hidden Trades," MPRA Paper 43799, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised May 2012.
- Gwenaël Piaser, 2014. "Common Agency Games with Common Value Exclusion, Convexity and Existence," Working Papers 2014-420, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
- Vladimir Asriyan & Victoria Vanasco, 2019.
"Security design in non-exclusive markets with asymmetric information,"
Economics Working Papers
1712, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Asriyan, Vladimir & Vanasco, Victoria, 2020. "Security design in non-exclusive markets with asymmetric information," CEPR Discussion Papers 14306, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Vladimir Asriyan & Victoria Vanasco, 2019. "Security Design in Non-Exclusive Markets with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 1164, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François, 2014.
"Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets,"
TSE Working Papers
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- Golosov, M. & Tsyvinski, A. & Werquin, N., 2016.
"Recursive Contracts and Endogenously Incomplete Markets,"
Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.),Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 725-841,
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RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(4), pages 777-790, October.
- Bertola, Giuseppe & Koeniger, Winfried, 2013. "Hidden insurance in a moral hazard economy," CFS Working Paper Series 2013/25, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
- Bertola, Giuseppe & Koeniger, Winfried, 2013. "Hidden Insurance in a Moral Hazard Economy," IZA Discussion Papers 7806, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Bertola, Giuseppe & Koeniger, Winfried, 2014. "Hidden Insurance in a Moral Hazard Economy," CEPR Discussion Papers 9864, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bertola, Giuseppe & Koeniger, Winfried, 2013. "Hidden Insurance in a Moral Hazard Economy," Economics Working Paper Series 1337, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
- Augustin Landier & Guillaume Plantin, 2017.
"Taxing the Rich,"
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- Augustin Landier & Guillaume Plantin, 2017. "Taxing the Rich," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/6poqlonjhj8, Sciences Po.
- Jonathan Heathcote & Kjetil Storesletten & Giovanni L. Violante, 2014.
"Consumption and Labor Supply with Partial Insurance: An Analytical Framework,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(7), pages 2075-2126, July.
- Kjetil Storesletten & Gianluca Violante & Jonathan Heathcote, 2007. "Consumption and Labor Supply with Partial Insurance: An Analytical Framework," 2007 Meeting Papers 913, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Jonathan Heathcote & Kjetil Storesletten & Giovanni L. Violante, 2009. "Consumption and labor supply with partial insurance: an analytical framework," Staff Report 432, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Jonathan Heathcote & Kjetil Storesletten & Giovanni L. Violante, 2009. "Consumption and Labor Supply with Partial Insurance: An Analytical Framework," NBER Working Papers 15257, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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