Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games
In games in which multiple principals contract simultaneously and non-cooperatively with the same agent, standard direct revelation mechanisms in which the agent reports his type(i.e. his exogenous private information) have been proven inadequate to characterize the entire set of equilibrium outcomes. This paper introduces a more general class of revelation mechanisms in which the agent reports also the contractual decisions he is inducing with the principals. We rst show that such a class has the same nice properties as the class of all unrestricted menus: (i) for any equilibrium of any indirect game with arbitrary communication space for the principals, there exists a truthful equilibrium in the game in which the principals are restricted to o¤er revelation mechanisms that sustains the same outcomes; (ii) any truthful equilibrium is robust in the sense that it remains an equilibrium in any game in which the principalsstrategy space is enlarged. We next show how revelation mechanisms can be put to work in applications such as menu auctions, moral hazard settings, and competition in non-linear tariffs to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for the sustainability of outcomes as common agency equilibria.
|Date of creation:||Jul 2007|
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