Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness
We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard: principals compete through mechanisms in the presence of agents who take unobservable actions. In this context, we provide a rationale for restricting principals to make use of simple mechanisms, which correspond to direct mechanisms in the standard framework of Myerson (J Math Econ 10:67–81, 1982 ). Our results complement those of Han (J Econ Theory 137(1):610–626, 2007 ) who analyzes a complete information setting where agents’ actions are fully contractible. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012
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Volume (Year): 16 (2012)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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