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Negotiation and Take it or Leave it in Common Agency


  • Michael Peters


This short paper considers the validity of assuming that principals make their common agent a single take it or leave it contract offer instead of negotiating over the contract in a more complex way. The interest in this question arises from recent examples in the literature that illustrate equilibrium allocations that can be supported with negotiation, but not with simple take it or leave it offers. It is shown that with symmetric information, pure strategy equilibrium with take it or leave it offers are also equilibria when principals are allowed to negotiate. We also provide a class of environments in which 'pure strategy' equilibria with negotiation can all be supported with simple take it or leave it offers. The environment is restrictive, but encompasses the environment studied by Bernheim and Whinston (1986), as well as the environment involved in a simple Bertrand pricing problem similar to Klemperer and Meyer (1989).

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Peters, 2000. "Negotiation and Take it or Leave it in Common Agency," Working Papers peters-00-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:tor:tecipa:peters-00-02

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 169-189, Winter.
    2. Bruno Biais & David Martimort & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2000. "Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(4), pages 799-838, July.
    3. Fershtman, Chaim & Kalai, Ehud, 1997. "Unobserved Delegation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(4), pages 763-774, November.
    4. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31.
    5. Peters, Michael, 2001. "Common Agency and the Revelation Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1349-1372, September.
    6. Prat, A. & Rustichini, A., 1998. "Sequential Common Agency," Discussion Paper 1998-95, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    7. Dixit, Avinash & Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1997. "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 752-769, August.
    8. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 169-189, Winter.
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    Cited by:

    1. Khalil, Fahad & Martimort, David & Parigi, Bruno, 2007. "Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 35-67, July.
    2. Graham Mallard, 2014. "Static Common Agency And Political Influence: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 17-35, February.
    3. Attar Andrea & Campioni Eloisa & Piaser Gwenael, 2006. "Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-35, October.
    4. Krasteva, Silvana & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2012. "On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 714-730.
    5. Attar, Andrea & Piaser, Gwenael & Porteiro, Nicolas, 2007. "A note on Common Agency models of moral hazard," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 95(2), pages 278-284, May.
    6. Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser & Uday Rajan, 2012. "Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 16(4), pages 283-296, December.
    7. Burnett, Johann Caro & Carrasco, Vinicius, 2011. "Coordination and the provision of incentives to a common regulated firm," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 606-627, September.
    8. Gwenael Piaser, 2004. "The Biais-Martimort-Rochet equilibrium with direct mechanisms," Game Theory and Information 0412007, EconWPA.
    9. Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François & Attar, Andrea, 2014. "Nonexclusive competition under adverse selection," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
    10. Chiesa, Gabriella & Denicolò, Vincenzo, 2009. "Trading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 296-311, January.
    11. Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2013. "Two-sided communication in competing mechanism games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 62-70.
    12. Han, Seungjin, 2007. "Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 610-626, November.
    13. ATTAR, Andrea & CAMPIONI, Eloisa & PIASER, Gwenaël & RAJAN, Uday, 2004. "Pure strategy and no-externalities with multiple agents : a comment," CORE Discussion Papers 2004050, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

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