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Strategic Risk Aversion

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Listed author(s):
  • SHerrill Shaffer

Abstract

This paper demonstrates that exaggerated risk aversion may comprise a rational form of strategic behavior in the face of asymmetric information. Unlike some other forms of strategic behavior analyzed previously, this behavior confers a benefit in the form of higher ex post consumption (not merely higher expected consumption or expected utility) and whether or not markets are perfectly competitive. Such behavior might help explain historically large equity premia.

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File URL: https://cama.crawford.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publication/cama_crawford_anu_edu_au/2017-02/25_shaffer_2008.pdf
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Paper provided by Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University in its series CAMA Working Papers with number 2008-25.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2008
Handle: RePEc:een:camaaa:2008-25
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