IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/fip/fedmqr/y2000iwinp3-13nv.24no.1.html

Diamond and Dybvig's classic theory of financial intermediation : what's missing?

Author

Listed:
  • Edward J. Green
  • Ping Lin

Abstract

The article shows that in a finite-trader version of the Diamond and Dybvig model (1983), the ex ante efficient allocation can be implemented as a unique equilibrium. This is so even in the presence of the sequential service constraint, as emphasized by Wallace (1988), whereby the bank must solve a sequence of maximization problems as depositors contact it at different times. A three-trader example with constant relative risk-aversion utility is used in order to illustrate clearly the requirements that the sequential service constraint imposes on implementation.

Suggested Citation

  • Edward J. Green & Ping Lin, 2000. "Diamond and Dybvig's classic theory of financial intermediation : what's missing?," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 3-13.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedmqr:y:2000:i:win:p:3-13:n:v.24no.1
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://minneapolisfed.org/research/qr/qr2411.html
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: http://minneapolisfed.org/research/qr/qr2411.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
    2. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
    3. Stephen D. Williamson, 1987. "Costly Monitoring, Loan Contracts, and Equilibrium Credit Rationing," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(1), pages 135-145.
    4. Bryant, John, 1980. "A model of reserves, bank runs, and deposit insurance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 335-344, December.
    5. Green, Edward J. & Lin, Ping, 2003. "Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(1), pages 1-23, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. John H. Boyd & Pedro Gomis-Porqueras & Sungkyu Kwak & Bruce David Smith, 2014. "A User's Guide to Banking Crises," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 15(2), pages 800-892, November.
    2. Gu, Chao & Monnet, Cyril & Nosal, Ed & Wright, Randall, 2023. "Diamond–Dybvig and beyond: On the instability of banking," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
    3. Ricardo de O. Cavalcanti, 2010. "Inside-money theory after Diamond and Dybvig," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 96(1Q), pages 59-82.
    4. Dietrich, Diemo & Gehrig, Thomas, 2025. "Scope and limits of bank liquidity creation," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    5. James J. McAndrews & William Roberds, 1999. "Payment intermediation and the origins of banking," Staff Reports 85, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    6. Andolfatto, David & Nosal, Ed, 2006. "Moral Hazard in the Diamond-Dybvig Model of Banking," MPRA Paper 1337, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Renee Courtois Haltom & Bruno Sultanum, 2018. "Preventing Bank Runs," Richmond Fed Economic Brief, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue March.
    8. Thomas Barnebeck Andersen & Finn Tarp, 2003. "Financial liberalization, financial development and economic growth in LDCs," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(2), pages 189-209.
    9. Ion Lapteacru, 2022. "What drives the risk of European banks during crises? New evidence and insights," Working Papers hal-03775463, HAL.
    10. Mark Gertler, 1988. "Financial structure and aggregate economic activity: an overview," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 559-596.
    11. George Kladakis & Lei Chen & Sotirios K. Bellos, 2022. "Wholesale funding and liquidity creation," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 59(4), pages 1501-1524, November.
    12. Xavier Vives, 2014. "Strategic Complementarity, Fragility, and Regulation," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 27(12), pages 3547-3592.
    13. Yeddou, Nacera & Pourroy, Marc, 2020. "Bank liquidity creation: Does ownership structure matter?," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 116-131.
    14. Donaldson, Jason Roderick & Piacentino, Giorgia & Thakor, Anjan, 2018. "Warehouse banking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 129(2), pages 250-267.
    15. Izumi, Ryuichiro & Li, Yang, 2025. "Rapid bank runs and delayed policy responses," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    16. Biswas, Sonny & Koufopoulos, Kostas, 2022. "Bank capital structure and regulation: Overcoming and embracing adverse selection," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(3), pages 973-992.
    17. Charles W. Calomiris & Gary Gorton, 1991. "The Origins of Banking Panics: Models, Facts, and Bank Regulation," NBER Chapters, in: Financial Markets and Financial Crises, pages 109-174, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Timothy Jackson & Laurence J. Kotlikoff, 2021. "Banks as Potentially Crooked Secret Keepers," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(7), pages 1593-1628, October.
    19. Keiichiro Kobayashi & Tomoyuki Nakajima, 2014. "A macroeconomic model of liquidity crises," KIER Working Papers 876, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    20. Pausch, Thilo, 2013. "Risk Sensitivity of Banks, Interbank Markets and the Effects of Liquidity Regulation," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79702, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedmqr:y:2000:i:win:p:3-13:n:v.24no.1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kate Hansel (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cfrbmus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.