Preventing Bank Runs
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Haltom, Renee Courtois & Sultanum, Bruno, 2018. "Preventing Bank Runs," Richmond Fed Economic Brief, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue March, pages 1-6.
- Andolfatto, David & Nosal, Ed & Sultanum, Bruno, 2017. "Preventing bank runs," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(3), September.
References listed on IDEAS
- Andolfatto, David & Nosal, Ed & Wallace, Neil, 2007.
"The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 709-715, November.
- David Andolfatto & Ed Nosal & Neil Wallace, 2006. "The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model," Working Paper 0615, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
- Green, Edward J. & Lin, Ping, 2003.
"Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 109(1), pages 1-23, March.
- Edward J. Green, 1995. "Implementing Efficient Allocations in a Model of Financial Intermediation," Meeting papers 9506001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Edward J. Green & Ping Lin, 1996. "Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation," Working Papers 576, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Salih N. Neftci & Andre O Santos, 2003. "Puttable and Extendible Bonds; Developing Interest Rate Derivatives for Emerging Markets," IMF Working Papers 03/201, International Monetary Fund.
- R. de O. Cavalcanti & P. K. Monteiro, 2016.
"Enriching information to prevent bank runs,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 62(3), pages 477-494, August.
- Cavalcanti, Ricardo de Oliveira & Monteiro, P. K., 2011. "Enriching information to prevent bank runs," FGV/EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 721, FGV/EPGE - Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
- Russell Cooper & Thomas W. Ross, 2002. "Bank Runs: Deposit Insurance and Capital Requirements," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(1), pages 55-72, February.
- Huberto M. Ennis & Todd Keister, 2009.
"Bank Runs and Institutions: The Perils of Intervention,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1588-1607, September.
- Huberto M. Ennis & Todd Keister, 2007. "Bank runs and institutions : the perils of intervention," Working Paper 07-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
- Ennis, Huberto M. & Keister, Todd, 2009. "Run equilibria in the Green-Lin model of financial intermediation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 1996-2020, September.
- Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23.
- Dilip Mookherjee & Stefan Reichelstein, 1990. "Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(3), pages 453-475.
- Gorton, Gary, 1985. "Clearinghouses and the Origin of Central Banking in the United States," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(02), pages 277-283, June.
- Ma, Ching-to & Moore, John & Turnbull, Stephen, 1988. "Stopping agents from "cheating"," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 355-372, December.
- Demski, Joel S. & Sappington, David, 1984. "Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 152-171, June.
- James Peck & Karl Shell, 2003.
"Bank Portfolio Restrictions and Equilibrium Bank Runs,"
666156000000000077, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Karl Shell & James Peck, 2004. "Bank Portfolio Restrictions and Equilibrium Bank Runs," 2004 Meeting Papers 359, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- James Peck & Karl Shell, 2003. "Equilibrium Bank Runs," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(1), pages 103-123, February.
- Postlewaite, Andrew & Schmeidler, David, 1986. "Implementation in differential information economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 14-33, June.
- Bryant, John, 1980. "A model of reserves, bank runs, and deposit insurance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 335-344, December.
- Neil Wallace, 1990. "A banking model in which partial suspension is best," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Fall, pages 11-23.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Andolfatto, David & Nosal, Ed, 2017. "Bank Panics and Scale Economies," Working Papers 2017-9, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
- Huberto Ennis & Todd Keister, 2016.
"Optimal banking contracts and financial fragility,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(2), pages 335-363, February.
- Li, Yang, 2017. "Interest rates and financial fragility," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 195-205.
- Bruno Sultanum, 2014. "Financial fragility and over-the-counter markets," 2014 Papers psu420, Job Market Papers.
- Zhen Zhou & Deepal Basak, 2015. "Diffusing Coordination Risk," 2015 Meeting Papers 1350, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Markus Kinateder & Hubert Janos Kiss & Agnes Pinter, 2015. "Would depositors like to show others that they do not withdraw? Theory and Experiment," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1553, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
- Fernando Martin & Aleksander Berentsen & David Andolfatto, 2016. "Financial Fragility in Monetary Economies," 2016 Meeting Papers 1626, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Simas Kucinskas, 2015. "Liquidity Creation without Banks," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 15-101/VI, Tinbergen Institute.
- Simas Kucinskas, 2015. "Liquidity creation without banks," DNB Working Papers 482, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
- Roberto Robatto, 2015. "Financial Crises and Systemic Bank Runs in a Dynamic Model of Banking," 2015 Meeting Papers 483, Society for Economic Dynamics.
More about this item
KeywordsBank runs; optimal deposit contract; financial fragility;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2015-01-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2015-01-14 (Banking)
- NEP-MAC-2015-01-14 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MIC-2015-01-14 (Microeconomics)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedhwp:wp-2014-19. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bernie Flores). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/frbchus.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.