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Online Appendix to "Expectations vs. Fundamentals- driven Bank Runs: When Should Bailouts be Permitted?"

Author

Listed:
  • Todd Keister

    (Rutgers University)

  • Vijay Narasiman

    (Harvard University)

Abstract

Online appendix for the Review of Economic Dynamics article

Suggested Citation

  • Todd Keister & Vijay Narasiman, 2015. "Online Appendix to "Expectations vs. Fundamentals- driven Bank Runs: When Should Bailouts be Permitted?"," Online Appendices 13-73, Review of Economic Dynamics.
    • Handle: RePEc:red:append:13-73
    Note: The original article was published in the Review of Economic Dynamics
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    File URL: https://red-files-public.s3.amazonaws.com/appendix/13/13-73/KN_appendix.pdf
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Sim, Khai Zhi, 2024. "Bank bailouts: Moral hazard and commitment," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
    2. David Andolfatto & Ed Nosal, 2017. "Bank Panics and Scale Economies," Working Papers 2017-9, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    3. Rishika Khetan & Varda Sardana & Shubham Singhania & Jagvinder Singh, 2025. "Financial stability through a global perspective: an in-depth integrative review," International Journal of System Assurance Engineering and Management, Springer;The Society for Reliability, Engineering Quality and Operations Management (SREQOM),India, and Division of Operation and Maintenance, Lulea University of Technology, Sweden, vol. 16(8), pages 2912-2929, August.
    4. Allen, Franklin & Carletti, Elena & Goldstein, Itay & Leonello, Agnese, 2018. "Government guarantees and financial stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 518-557.
    5. Schilling, Linda, 2020. "On the (Ir)relevance of Firm Size for Bail-outs under Voter-Neutrality: The Case of Foreign Stakeholders," CEPR Discussion Papers 15508, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Schilling, Linda, 2023. "Voters, Bailouts, and the Size of the Firm," MPRA Paper 118146, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Roberto Robatto, 2018. "Flight to Liquidity and Systemic Bank Runs," 2018 Meeting Papers 276, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    8. Gao, Jiahong & Reed, Robert R., 2021. "Sunspot bank runs and fragility: The role of financial sector competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    9. Fernando Martin & Aleksander Berentsen & David Andolfatto, 2016. "Financial Fragility in Monetary Economies," 2016 Meeting Papers 1626, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    10. Schilling, Linda, 2019. "Too many Voters to Fail: Influencing and Political Bargaining for Bailouts," CEPR Discussion Papers 14243, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Manuel Amador & Javier Bianchi, 2024. "Bank Runs, Fragility, and Credit Easing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 114(7), pages 2073-2110, July.
    12. Mitkov, Yuliyan, 2020. "Inequality and financial fragility," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 233-248.
    13. Izumi, Ryuichiro & Li, Yang, 2025. "Rapid bank runs and delayed policy responses," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    14. Allen N. Berger & Charles P. Himmelberg & Raluca A. Roman & Sergey Tsyplakov, 2022. "Bank bailouts, bail‐ins, or no regulatory intervention? A dynamic model and empirical tests of optimal regulation and implications for future crises," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 51(4), pages 1031-1090, December.
    15. Edoardo Rainone, 2021. "Identifying deposits' outflows in real-time," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1319, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    16. Huberto Ennis & Todd Keister, 2016. "Optimal banking contracts and financial fragility," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(2), pages 335-363, February.
    17. Sim, Khai Zhi, 2022. "The optimal bailout policy in an interbank network," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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