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Bank Runs, Fragility, and Credit Easing

Author

Listed:
  • Manuel Amador
  • Javier Bianchi

Abstract

We present a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model of self-fulfilling bank runs, where banks trade capital in competitive and liquid markets but remain vulnerable to runs due to a loss of creditor confidence. We characterize how the vulnerability of an individual bank depends on its leverage position and the economy wide asset prices. We study the effect of credit easing policies, in the form of asset purchases. When a banking crisis is generated by runs, credit easing can reduce the number of defaulting banks and enhance welfare. When the crisis is driven by fundamentals, credit easing may have adverse consequences.

Suggested Citation

  • Manuel Amador & Javier Bianchi, 2021. "Bank Runs, Fragility, and Credit Easing," NBER Working Papers 29397, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29397
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    Cited by:

    1. Sergio A. Correia & Stephan Luck & Emil Verner, 2024. "Failing Banks," Staff Reports 1117, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    2. Collard, Fabrice & Boissay, Frédéric & Galì, Jordi & Manea, Cristina, 2021. "Monetary Policy and Endogenous Financial Crises," TSE Working Papers 21-1277, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Apr 2023.
    3. Arce, Fernando & Bengui, Julien & Bianchi, Javier, 2025. "Overborrowing, underborrowing, and macroprudential policy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 227(C).
    4. Mengus, Eric, 2023. "Asset purchase bailouts and endogenous implicit guarantees," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
    5. Javier Bianchi, 2022. "The Research Agenda: Javier Bianchi on Financial Crises and Prudential Policies," EconomicDynamics Newsletter, Review of Economic Dynamics, vol. 23(1), April.
    6. Kaldorf, Matthias & Rottner, Matthias, 2024. "Climate Minsky Moments and endogenous financial crises," Discussion Papers 26/2024, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    7. Rottner, Matthias, 2023. "Financial crises and shadow banks: A quantitative analysis," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 74-92.
    8. Christian Bittner & Rustam Jamilov & Farzad Saidi, 2025. "Assortative Matching, Interbank Markets, and Monetary Policy," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2025_642, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation

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