Financial Fragility in Monetary Economies
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More about this item
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2016-12-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2016-12-18 (Banking)
- NEP-CBA-2016-12-18 (Central Banking)
- NEP-DGE-2016-12-18 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-MAC-2016-12-18 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2016-12-18 (Monetary Economics)
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