Moral hazard in the Diamond-Dybvig model of banking
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- Andolfatto, David & Nosal, Ed, 2006. "Moral Hazard in the Diamond-Dybvig Model of Banking," MPRA Paper 1337, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ed Nosal & David Andolfatto, 2007. "Moral Hazard in the Diamond-Dybvig Model of Banking," 2007 Meeting Papers 221, Society for Economic Dynamics.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsContracts ; Financial crises ; Banks and banking;
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
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