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Risk Aversion, Liquidity, and Endogenous Short Horizons

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  • Holden, Craig W
  • Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar

Abstract

We analyze a competitive model in which different information signals get reflected in value at different points in time. If investors are sufficiently risk averse, we obtain an equilibrium in which all investors focus exclusively on the short term. In addition, we show that increasing the variance of informationless trading increases market depth but causes a greater proportion of investors to focus on the short-term signal, which decreases the informativeness of prices about the long run. Finally, we also explore parameter spaces under which long-term informed agents wish to voluntarily disclose their information. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.

Suggested Citation

  • Holden, Craig W & Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar, 1996. "Risk Aversion, Liquidity, and Endogenous Short Horizons," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 9(2), pages 691-722.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:9:y:1996:i:2:p:691-722
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    Cited by:

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    2. Alexander Gümbel, 2005. "Trading on Short-Term Information," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 161(3), pages 428-452, September.
    3. Bagnoli, Mark & Watts, Susan G., 1998. "Information acquisition, information release and trading dynamics," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 221-252, August.
    4. Shiyang Huang & Bart Zhou Yueshen, 2021. "Speed Acquisition," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(6), pages 3492-3518, June.
    5. Giovanni Cespa, 2008. "Information Sales and Insider Trading with Long‐Lived Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(2), pages 639-672, April.
    6. Alexander Gümbel, 2005. "Should short-term speculators be taxed, or subsidised?," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 327-348, August.
    7. Dugast, Jérôme & Foucault, Thierry, 2018. "Data abundance and asset price informativeness," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(2), pages 367-391.
    8. Miettinen, Topi & Stenbacka, Rune, 2018. "Strategic short-termism: Implications for the management and acquisition of customer relationships," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 200-222.
    9. Sherrill Shaffer, 2011. "Strategic risk aversion," Applied Financial Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(13), pages 949-956.
    10. Benchimol, Jonathan, 2016. "Money and monetary policy in Israel during the last decade," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 103-124.
    11. Benchimol, Jonathan & Fourçans, André, 2012. "Money and risk in a DSGE framework: A Bayesian application to the Eurozone," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 95-111.
    12. Giovanni Cespa, 2008. "Information Sales and Insider Trading with Long‐Lived Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(2), pages 639-672, April.
    13. Matthew Spiegel, 1998. "Closed-End Fund Discounts in a Rational Agent Economy," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm80, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Aug 2000.
    14. Avanidhar Subrahmanyam & Sheridan Titman, 2013. "Financial Market Shocks and the Macroeconomy," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 26(11), pages 2687-2717.
    15. Casamatta, Catherine & Pouget, Sébastien, 2009. "Fund Managers' Contracts and Financial Markets' Short-Termism," IDEI Working Papers 553, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Feb 2011.
    16. Thomas Conlon & John Cotter & Ramazan Gençay, 2016. "Commodity futures hedging, risk aversion and the hedging horizon," The European Journal of Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(15), pages 1534-1560, December.
    17. Hirshleifer, David & Teoh, Siew Hong, 2008. "Thought and Behavior Contagion in Capital Markets," MPRA Paper 9164, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Holden, Craig W. & Lundstrum, Leonard L., 2009. "Costly trade, managerial myopia, and long-term investment," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 126-135, January.
    19. David Hirshleifer & Siew Hong Teoh, 2003. "Herd Behaviour and Cascading in Capital Markets: a Review and Synthesis," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 9(1), pages 25-66, March.
    20. Muendler, Marc-Andreas, 2005. "Rational Information Choice in Financial Market Equilibrium," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt5q4764nj, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    21. Holden, Craig W. & Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar, 1998. "New Events, Information Acquisition, and Serial Correlation," University of California at Los Angeles, Anderson Graduate School of Management qt4d2537cg, Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA.
    22. Matthew Spiegel, 1997. "Closed-End Fund Discounts in a Rational Agent Economy," Finance 9712002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    23. Wu, Chunchi & Xu, Xiaoqing Eleanor, 2000. "Return Volatility, Trading Imbalance and the Information Content of Volume," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 131-153, March.
    24. Florian Eugster, 2020. "Endogeneity and the Dynamics of Voluntary Disclosure Quality: Is there Really an Effect on the Cost of Equity Capital?," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(4), pages 2590-2614, December.

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