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Should Insider Trading be Prohibited when Share Repurchases are Allowed?

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  • Andrea M. Buffa
  • Giovanna Nicodano

Abstract

This paper considers share repurchases as the way long-term shareholders preserve their ability to use corporate information for speculative purposes when insider trading regulation is enforced. This use of corporate information increases the adverse selection losses of short-term shareholders. Thus, buy-back programs reduce their incentive to invest in stocks that back the most productive technology, leading to a socially inefficient equilibrium. It follows that insider trading should not be banned when share repurchases are allowed. More generally, the paper argues that the regulation of insider trading and repurchases can not be considered in isolation, and analyzes their interplay. Copyright 2008, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrea M. Buffa & Giovanna Nicodano, 2008. "Should Insider Trading be Prohibited when Share Repurchases are Allowed?," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 12(4), pages 735-765.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:revfin:v:12:y:2008:i:4:p:735-765
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    3. Ilona Babenko & Yuri Tserlukevich & Pengcheng Wan, 2020. "Is Market Timing Good for Shareholders?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(8), pages 3542-3560, August.
    4. Fabio C. Bagliano & Carlo A. Favero & Giovanna Nicodano, 2011. "Insider Trading, Traded Volume and Returns," Working papers 26, Former Department of Economics and Public Finance "G. Prato", University of Torino.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law

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