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What Do Insiders Know? Evidence from Insider Trading Around Share Repurchases and SEOs

Author

Listed:
  • Peter Cziraki

    (University of Toronto - Department of Economics; Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC))

  • Evgeny Lyandres

    (Boston University)

  • Roni Michaely

    (University of Geneva - Geneva Finance Research Institute (GFRI); Swiss Finance Institute)

Abstract

We examine the nature of information contained in insider trades prior to corporate events. Insiders’ net buying increases before open market share repurchase announcements and decreases before SEOs. Higher insider net buying is associated with better post-event operating performance, a reduction in undervaluation, and, for repurchases, lower post-event cost of capital. Insider trading predicts announcement returns and, for repurchases, the long-term drift following events. Overall, our results suggest that insider trades before corporate events contain information about changes both in fundamentals and in investor sentiment. Information about fundamentals is incorporated slowly into prices, while information about mispricing is incorporated faster.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Cziraki & Evgeny Lyandres & Roni Michaely, 2019. "What Do Insiders Know? Evidence from Insider Trading Around Share Repurchases and SEOs," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 19-11, Swiss Finance Institute, revised Mar 2019.
    • Handle: RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp1911
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    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy

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