Regulating Insider Trading When Investment Matters
We provide a general framework for analyzing the effects of insider trading on real investment and welfare as well as the consequences of different regulatory policies in a model where all traders are rational expected-utility maximizers and aware of their position in the market. We find that: with costly information acquisition, an "abstain-or-disclose" rule tends to be optimal; with free information acquisition, laissez-faire is better. This suggests enforcing an abstain-or-disclose rule with a high standard of proof for inside information. Our approach also uncovers the pitfalls of welfare analysis in the noise-trader model.
Volume (Year): 8 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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