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Dynamic Trading and Asset Prices: Keynes vs. Hayek

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  • Giovanni Cespa

    () (Queen Mary University of London, Università di Salerno, CSEF and CEPR)

  • Xavier Vives

    (IESE Business School and UPF)

Abstract

We investigate the dynamics of prices, information and expectations in a competitive, noisy, dynamic asset pricing equilibrium model. We look at the bias of prices as estimators of fundamental value in relation to traders' average expectations and note that prices are more (less) biased than average expectations if and only if traders over- (under-) rely on public information with respect to optimal statistical weights. We find that prices are biased in relation to average expectations whenever traders speculate on short-run price move- ments. In a market with long term traders, over-reliance on public information obtains if noise trade increments are correlated enough and/or there is low enough residual uncertainty in the payoff. This defines a “Keynesian” region; the complementary region is “Hayekian” in that prices are less biased than average expectations in the estimation of fundamental value. The standard case of no residual uncertainty and noise trading following a random walk is on the frontier of the two regions. With short-term traders there typically are two equilibria, with the stable (unstable) one displaying over- (under-) reliance on public information.

Suggested Citation

  • Giovanni Cespa & Xavier Vives, 2008. "Dynamic Trading and Asset Prices: Keynes vs. Hayek," CSEF Working Papers 191, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  • Handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:191
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Albagli, Elias, 2015. "Investment horizons and asset prices under asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PB), pages 787-837.
    2. Cespa, Giovanni & Vives, Xavier, 2011. "Higher order expectations, illiquidity, and short-term trading," IESE Research Papers D/915, IESE Business School.
    3. Giovanni Cespa & Xavier Vives, 2016. "High Frequency Trading and Fragility," CESifo Working Paper Series 6279, CESifo Group Munich.
    4. Han, Yufeng & Zhou, Guofu & Zhu, Yingzi, 2016. "A trend factor: Any economic gains from using information over investment horizons?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 352-375.
    5. Jia, Xue, 2016. "On the role of information disclosures in capital markets," Other publications TiSEM 9bacfbaa-2162-49fe-92e6-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. Peck, James, 2014. "A battle of informed traders and the market game foundations for rational expectations equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 153-173.
    7. Cespa, Giovanni & Vives, Xavier, 2011. "Expectations, Liquidity, and Short-term Trading," CEPR Discussion Papers 8303, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Marco Ottaviani & Peter Norman Sørensen, 2015. "Price Reaction to Information with Heterogeneous Beliefs and Wealth Effects: Underreaction, Momentum, and Reversal," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(1), pages 1-34, January.
    9. Albuquerque, Rui & Miao, Jianjun, 2014. "Advance information and asset prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 236-275.
    10. George-Marios Angeletos & Guido Lorenzoni & Alessandro Pavan, 2007. "Wall Street and Silicon Valley: A Delicate Interaction," NBER Working Papers 13475, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Giovanni Cespa & Xavier Vives, 2015. "The Beauty Contest and Short-Term Trading," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(5), pages 2099-2154, October.
    12. Allen, Franklin & Vayanos, Dimitri & Vives, Xavier, 2014. "Introduction to financial economics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 1-14.
    13. Pavan, Alessandro & Vives, Xavier, 2015. "Information, Coordination, and Market Frictions: An Introduction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PB), pages 407-426.
    14. George-Marios Angeletos & Guido Lorenzoni & Alessandro Pavan, 2010. "Beauty Contests and Irrational Exuberance: A Neoclassical Approach," NBER Working Papers 15883, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Kristoffer Nimark, 2009. "Speculative dynamics in the term structure of interest rates," Economics Working Papers 1194, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Sep 2012.
    16. Nimark, Kristoffer P, 2017. "Dynamic Higher Order Expectations," CEPR Discussion Papers 11863, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Liu, Hong & Wang, Yajun, 2016. "Market making with asymmetric information and inventory risk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 73-109.
    18. Kristoffer Nimark, 2017. "Dynamic Higher Order Expectations," 2017 Meeting Papers 1132, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    19. Andrei, Daniel & Cujean, Julien, 2017. "Information percolation, momentum and reversal," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(3), pages 617-645.
    20. repec:eee:macchp:v2-1065 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Price bias; long and short-term trading; multiple equilibria; average expectations; higher order beliefs; over-reliance on public information.;

    JEL classification:

    • G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading

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