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Insiders-outsiders, transparency and the value of the ticker

  • Cespa, Giovanni
  • Foucault, Thierry

We consider a multi-period rational expectations model in which risk-averse investors differ in their information on past transaction prices (the ticker). Some investors (insiders) observe prices in real-time whereas other investors (outsiders) observe prices with a delay. As prices are informative about the asset payoff, insiders get a strictly larger expected utility than outsiders. Yet, information acquisition by one investor exerts a negative externality on other investors. Thus, investors' average welfare is maximal when access to price information is rationed. We show that a market for price information can implement the fraction of insiders that maximizes investors' average welfare. This market features a high price to curb excessive acquisition of ticker information. We also show that informational efficiency is greater when the dissemination of ticker information is broader and more timely.

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Paper provided by Center for Financial Studies (CFS) in its series CFS Working Paper Series with number 2008/39.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:cfswop:200839
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  1. Hasbrouck, Joel, 1995. " One Security, Many Markets: Determining the Contributions to Price Discovery," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(4), pages 1175-99, September.
  2. Xavier Vives, 1994. "Short-term Investment and the Informational Efficiency of the Market," CEPR Financial Markets Paper 0034, European Science Foundation Network in Financial Markets, c/o C.E.P.R, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ..
  3. Hellwig, Martin F., 1982. "Rational expectations equilibrium with conditioning on past prices: A mean-variance example," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 279-312, April.
  4. Hellwig, Martin F., 1980. "On the aggregation of information in competitive markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 477-498, June.
  5. Marin, Jose M & Rahi, Rohit, 2000. "Information Revelation and Market Incompleteness," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(3), pages 563-79, July.
  6. James Dow & Rohit Rahi, 1996. "Informed Trading, Investment and Welfare," Archive Working Papers 029, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
  7. Craig Pirrong, 2002. "Securities Market Macrostructure: Property Rights and the Efficiency of Securities Trading," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(2), pages 385-410, October.
  8. Luis Angel Medrano & Xavier Vives, 2004. "Regulating Insider Trading When Investment Matters," Review of Finance, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 199-277.
  9. Mulherin, J Harold & Netter, Jeffry M & Overdahl, James A, 1992. "Prices Are Property: The Organization of Financial Exchanges from a Transaction Cost Perspective," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(2), pages 591-644, October.
  10. Pagano, Marco & Roell, Ailsa, 1996. " Transparency and Liquidity: A Comparison of Auction and Dealer Markets with Informed Trading," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(2), pages 579-611, June.
  11. Diamond, Douglas W, 1985. " Optimal Release of Information by Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 40(4), pages 1071-94, September.
  12. Brennan, Michael J & Cao, H Henry, 1996. "Information, Trade, and Derivative Securities," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 9(1), pages 163-208.
  13. Giovanni Cespa, 2007. "Information Sales and Insider Trading with Long-lived Information," Working Papers 613, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  14. Cespa, Giovanni, 2004. "Information Sales and Insider Trading," CEPR Discussion Papers 4667, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  15. Madhavan, Ananth, 1995. "Consolidation, Fragmentation, and the Disclosure of Trading Information," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 8(3), pages 579-603.
  16. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1971. "The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 561-74, September.
  17. Biais, Bruno, 1993. " Price Information and Equilibrium Liquidity in Fragmented and Centralized Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(1), pages 157-85, March.
  18. Reena Aggarwal & Sandeep Dahiya, 2006. "Demutualization and Public Offerings of Financial Exchanges," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 18(3), pages 96-106.
  19. Admati, Anat R. & Pfleiderer, Paul, 1987. "Viable allocations of information in financial markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 76-115, October.
  20. Admati, Anat R & Pfleiderer, Paul, 1990. "Direct and Indirect Sale of Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(4), pages 901-28, July.
  21. Verrecchia, Robert E, 1982. "Information Acquisition in a Noisy Rational Expectations Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1415-30, November.
  22. Giovanni Cespa, 2007. "Information Sales and Insider Trading with Long-lived Information," CSEF Working Papers 174, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  23. Admati, Anat R. & Pfleiderer, Paul, 1986. "A monopolistic market for information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 400-438, August.
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