IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/rfinst/v8y1995i3p579-603.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Consolidation, Fragmentation, and the Disclosure of Trading Information

Author

Listed:
  • Madhavan, Ananth

Abstract

It is commonly believed that fragmented security markets have a natural tendency to consolidate. This article examines this belief focusing on the effect of disclosing trading information to market participants. We show that large traders who place multiple trades can benefit from the absence of trade disclosure in a fragmented market, as can dealers who face less price competition than in a unified market. Consequently, a fragmented market need not coalesce into a single market unless trade disclosure is mandatory. We also compare and contrast fragmented and consolidated markets. Fragmentation results in higher price volatility and violations of price efficiency. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.

Suggested Citation

  • Madhavan, Ananth, 1995. "Consolidation, Fragmentation, and the Disclosure of Trading Information," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 8(3), pages 579-603.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:8:y:1995:i:3:p:579-603
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.jstor.org/fcgi-bin/jstor/listjournal.fcg/08939454
    File Function: full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:8:y:1995:i:3:p:579-603. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sfsssea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.