IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/6794.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Insiders-Outsiders, Transparency and the Value of the Ticker

Author

Listed:
  • Cespa, Giovanni
  • Foucault, Thierry

Abstract

Some investors (insiders) observe prices in real-time whereas other investors (outsiders) observe prices with a delay. As prices are informative about the asset payoff, insiders get a strictly larger expected utility than outsiders. Yet, information acquisition by one investor exerts a negative externality on other investors. Thus, investors’ average welfare is maximal when access to price information is rationed. We show that a market for price information can implement the fraction of insiders that maximizes investors’ average welfare. This market features a high price to curb excessive acquisition of ticker information. We also show that informational efficiency is greater when the dissemination of ticker information is broader and more timely.

Suggested Citation

  • Cespa, Giovanni & Foucault, Thierry, 2008. "Insiders-Outsiders, Transparency and the Value of the Ticker," CEPR Discussion Papers 6794, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6794
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=6794
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Giovanni Cespa, 2007. "Information Sales and Insider Trading with Long-lived Information," Working Papers 613, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    2. Hellwig, Martin F., 1982. "Rational expectations equilibrium with conditioning on past prices: A mean-variance example," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 279-312, April.
    3. Hasbrouck, Joel, 1995. " One Security, Many Markets: Determining the Contributions to Price Discovery," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(4), pages 1175-1199, September.
    4. Verrecchia, Robert E, 1982. "Information Acquisition in a Noisy Rational Expectations Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1415-1430, November.
    5. Madhavan, Ananth, 1995. "Consolidation, Fragmentation, and the Disclosure of Trading Information," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 8(3), pages 579-603.
    6. José M. Marín & Rohit Rahi, 2000. "Information Revelation and Market Incompleteness," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(3), pages 563-579.
    7. Biais, Bruno, 1993. " Price Information and Equilibrium Liquidity in Fragmented and Centralized Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(1), pages 157-185, March.
    8. Luis Angel Medran & Xavier Vives, 2004. "Regulating Insider Trading When Investment Matters," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 8(2), pages 199-277.
    9. Admati, Anat R. & Pfleiderer, Paul, 1987. "Viable allocations of information in financial markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 76-115, October.
    10. Mulherin, J Harold & Netter, Jeffry M & Overdahl, James A, 1992. "Prices Are Property: The Organization of Financial Exchanges from a Transaction Cost Perspective," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(2), pages 591-644, October.
    11. Giovanni Cespa, 2007. "Information Sales and Insider Trading with Long-lived Information," CSEF Working Papers 174, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    12. Hellwig, Martin F., 1980. "On the aggregation of information in competitive markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 477-498, June.
    13. James Dow, 2003. "Informed Trading, Investment, and Welfare," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76(3), pages 439-454, July.
    14. Vives, Xavier, 1995. "Short-Term Investment and the Informational Efficiency of the Market," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 8(1), pages 125-160.
    15. Pagano, Marco & Roell, Ailsa, 1996. " Transparency and Liquidity: A Comparison of Auction and Dealer Markets with Informed Trading," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(2), pages 579-611, June.
    16. Diamond, Douglas W, 1985. " Optimal Release of Information by Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 40(4), pages 1071-1094, September.
    17. Brennan, Michael J & Cao, H Henry, 1996. "Information, Trade, and Derivative Securities," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 9(1), pages 163-208.
    18. Craig Pirrong, 2002. "Securities Market Macrostructure: Property Rights and the Efficiency of Securities Trading," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(2), pages 385-410, October.
    19. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1971. "The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 561-574, September.
    20. Cespa, Giovanni, 2004. "Information Sales and Insider Trading," CEPR Discussion Papers 4667, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    21. Admati, Anat R. & Pfleiderer, Paul, 1986. "A monopolistic market for information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 400-438, August.
    22. Reena Aggarwal & Sandeep Dahiya, 2006. "Demutualization and Public Offerings of Financial Exchanges," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 18(3), pages 96-106.
    23. Admati, Anat R & Pfleiderer, Paul, 1990. "Direct and Indirect Sale of Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(4), pages 901-928, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Giovanni Cespa & Xavier Vives, 2012. "Dynamic Trading and Asset Prices: Keynes vs. Hayek," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 79(2), pages 539-580.
    2. Yacine Aït-Sahalia & Mehmet Saglam, 2013. "High Frequency Traders: Taking Advantage of Speed," NBER Working Papers 19531, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. repec:wsi:qjfxxx:v:02:y:2012:i:03:n:s2010139212500140 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Álvaro Cartea & José Penalva, 2012. "Where is the Value in High Frequency Trading?," Quarterly Journal of Finance (QJF), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 2(03), pages 1-46.
    5. Sirnes, Espen, 2011. "Why falling information costs may increase demand for index funds," Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 37-47, January.
    6. Giovanni Cespa, 2007. "Information Sales and Insider Trading with Long-lived Information," Working Papers 613, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    7. Cespa, Giovanni & Foucault, Thierry, 2011. "Learning from Prices, Liquidity Spillovers, and Market Segmentation," CEPR Discussion Papers 8350, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Hirshleifer effect; Market data sales; Price discovery; Transparency;

    JEL classification:

    • G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6794. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.