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Information Revelation and Market Incompleteness

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  • Jose Marin
  • Rohit Rahi

Abstract

\documentstyle[portada,11pt]{article} This paper shows that the presence of private information in an economy can be a source of market incompleteness even when it is feasible to issue a set of securities that completely eliminates the informational asymmetries in equilibrium. We analyze a simple security design model in which a volume maximizing futures exchange chooses not only the characteristics of each individual contract but also the number of contracts. Agents have rational expectations and differ in information, endowments and, possibly, attitudes toward risk. The emergence of complete or incomplete markets in equilibrium depends on whether the {\it adverse selection effect} is stronger or weaker than the {\it Hirshleifer effect}, as new securities are issued and prices reveal more information. When the Hirshleifer effect dominates, the exchange chooses an incomplete set of financial contracts, and the equilibrium price is partially revealing.
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Suggested Citation

  • Jose Marin & Rohit Rahi, 1996. "Information Revelation and Market Incompleteness," Archive Working Papers 024, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
  • Handle: RePEc:bbk:bbkifr:024
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bhattacharya Utpal & Reny Philip J. & Spiegel Matthew, 1995. "Destructive Interference in an Imperfectly Competitive Multi-Security Market," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 136-170, February.
    2. Allen, Franklin & Gale, Douglas, 1991. "Arbitrage, Short Sales, and Financial Innovation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 1041-1068, July.
    3. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 1990. "Incomplete Markets and Incentives to Set Up an Options Exchange*," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 15(1), pages 17-46, March.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading

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