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A Comparison of Stock Market Mechanism

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Abstract

I analyze a static, noisy rational expectations equilibrium model where traders exchange vectors of assets accessing multi-dimensional information under two alternative market structures. In the first (the unrestricted system), informed speculators condition their demands for each asset on all equilibrium prices and market makers set prices observing all order flows; in the second (the restricted system), speculators are restricted to condition their demand on the price of the asset they want to trade and market makers only observe the order flow of the asset they price. I show that informed traders' incentives to collect and exploit multi-dimensional private information depend on the number of prices they can condition upon when submitting their demand schedules, and on the specific price formation process one considers. Building on this insight, I then give conditions under which the restricted system is more efficient than the unrestricted system.

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  • Giovanni Cespa, 2003. "A Comparison of Stock Market Mechanism," CSEF Working Papers 94, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    • Handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:94
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    1. Bossaerts, Peter & Fine, Leslie & Ledyard, John, 2002. "Inducing liquidity in thin financial markets through combined-value trading mechanisms," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(9), pages 1671-1695, October.
    2. Giovanni Cespa, 2008. "Information Sales and Insider Trading with Long‐Lived Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(2), pages 639-672, April.
    3. Giovanni Cespa & Thierry Focault, 2011. "Learning from Prices, Liquidity Spillovers, and Market Segmentation," CSEF Working Papers 284, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    4. Eric Budish & Peter Cramton & Albert S. Kyle & Jeongmin Lee & David Malec, 2022. "Flow Trading," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 146, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
      • Eric Budish & Peter Cramton & Albert S. Kyle & Jeongmin Lee & David Malec, 2023. "Flow Trading," NBER Working Papers 31098, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Giovanni Cespa, 2005. "Giffen goods and market making," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 25(4), pages 983-997, June.
    6. Schellhorn, Henry, 2011. "A trading mechanism contingent on several indices," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 213(3), pages 551-558, September.
    7. Marzena Rostek & Ji Hee Yoon, 2021. "Exchange Design and Efficiency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(6), pages 2887-2928, November.
    8. Giovanni Cespa, 2008. "Information Sales and Insider Trading with Long‐Lived Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(2), pages 639-672, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    financial economics; asset pricing; information and market efficiency; market mechanisms;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading

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