Electronic Call Market Trading
Despite its power as a transactions network, scant attention has been given to incorporating an electronic call into a major market center such as the NYSE or Nasdaq. An electronic call clears the markets for all assets at predetermined points in time. By bunching many transactions together, a call market increases liquidity, thereby decreasing transaction costs for public participants. After describing alternative call market structures and their attributes, we propose that an open book electronic call be held three times during the trading day: at the open, at 12:00 noon, and at the close. We discuss the impact of this innovation on an array of issues, including order flow and handling, information revelation, and market transparency. We also discuss the proposed changes from the perspectives of investors, listed companies, exchanges, brokers, and regulators.
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|Publication status:||published in Journal of Portfolio Management, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 10- 18, (Spring 1995).|
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345, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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