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Market Manipulation and the Role of Insider Trading Regulations

Author

Listed:
  • John, Kose
  • Narayanan, Ranga

Abstract

The authors show that the regulation requiring corporate insiders to disclose their trades ex post creates incentives for informed insiders to manipulate the market by sometimes trading against their information. This allows them to increase their trading profits by maintaining their information advantage over the market for a longer period of time. Such manipulation lowers initial bid-ask spreads. The authors show how the insider's likelihood of manipulation is affected by her information advantage, the number of other insiders, market liquidity, the early arrival of public information, and the choice of trade size. The short swing profit rule curtails this manipulation. Copyright 1997 by University of Chicago Press.

Suggested Citation

  • John, Kose & Narayanan, Ranga, 1997. "Market Manipulation and the Role of Insider Trading Regulations," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70(2), pages 217-247, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jnlbus:v:70:y:1997:i:2:p:217-47
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Archishman Chakraborty & Bilge Yilmaz, "undated". "Nested Information and Manipulation in Financial Markets," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 06-00, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
    2. Emilio Barucci & Carlo Bianchi & Alberto Manconi, 2006. "Internal dealing regulation and insiders’ trades in the Italian financial market," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 107-119, September.
    3. Lee, Cheng-Few & YiLin, Wu, 2009. "Two-stage models for the analysis of information content of equity-selling mechanisms choices," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 123-133, January.
    4. Chakraborty, Archishman & Yilmaz, Bilge, 2004. "Informed manipulation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 132-152, January.
    5. Vikas Agarwal & Kevin A. Mullally & Yuehua Tang & Baozhong Yang, 2015. "Mandatory Portfolio Disclosure, Stock Liquidity, and Mutual Fund Performance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(6), pages 2733-2776, December.
    6. Lee, Eun Jung & Eom, Kyong Shik & Park, Kyung Suh, 2013. "Microstructure-based manipulation: Strategic behavior and performance of spoofing traders," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 227-252.
    7. Niemeyer, Jonas, 2001. "Where to Go after the Lamfalussy Report? - An Economic Analysis of Securities Market Regulation and Supervision," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 482, Stockholm School of Economics.
    8. Maxim, Maruf Rahman & Ashif, Abu Sadat Muhammad, 2017. "A new method of measuring stock market manipulation through structural equation modeling (SEM)," MPRA Paper 82891, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar & Titman, Sheridan, 1998. "Feedback from Stock Prices to Cash Flows†(formerly called “Real Effects of Financial Market Trading)," University of California at Los Angeles, Anderson Graduate School of Management qt2hw9m972, Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA.
    10. Archishman Chakraborty & Bilge Yilmaz, 2008. "Microstructure Bluffing with Nested Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(2), pages 280-284, May.
    11. Will Matthias Georg & Pies Ingo, 2014. "Insiderhandel und die Neuordnung der Kapitalmärkte: Ein Beitrag zur Regulierungsdebatte in Europa / Insider Trade and the New Ordering of Capital Markets: A Contribution to the Regulatory Debate in Eu," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 65(1), pages 159-182, January.
    12. Andrea M. Buffa & Giovanna Nicodano, 2008. "Should Insider Trading be Prohibited when Share Repurchases are Allowed?," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 12(4), pages 735-765.
    13. Calcagno, R. & Lovo, S.M., 2002. "Market Efficiency and Price Formation When Dealers are Asymmetrically Informed," Discussion Paper 2002-42, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    14. repec:eee:jetheo:v:169:y:2017:i:c:p:517-545 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Chakraborty, Archishman & Yilmaz, Bilge, 2004. "Manipulation in market order models," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 187-206, February.
    16. Xiangbo Liu & Zijun Liu & Zhigang Qiu, 2013. "Stock Market Manipulation in the Presence of Fund Flows," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 14(2), pages 483-491, November.
    17. Giambona, Erasmo & Golec, Joseph, 2010. "Strategic trading in the wrong direction by a large institutional insider," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 1-22, January.
    18. Felixson, Karl & Pelli, Anders, 1999. "Day end returns--stock price manipulation," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 95-127, March.
    19. Carole Comerton-Forde & James Rydge, 2006. "Market Integrity and Surveillance Effort," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 29(2), pages 149-172, April.
    20. Joseph Golec, 2007. "Are the Insider Trades of a Large Institutional Investor Informed?," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 42(2), pages 161-190, May.
    21. Matthew Pritsker, 2005. "Large investors: implications for equilibrium asset, returns, shock absorption, and liquidity," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2005-36, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    22. Chi-Wen Lee & Zemin Lu, 2008. "Trading on inside information when there may be tippees," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 241-260, October.
    23. Agarwal, Vikas & Mullally, Kevin & Tang, Yuehua & Yang, Baozhong, 2013. "Mandatory portfolio disclosure, stock liquidity, and mutual fund performance," CFR Working Papers 13-04, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
    24. Tālis J. Putniņš, 2012. "Market Manipulation: A Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(5), pages 952-967, December.
    25. Will, Matthias Georg & Pies, Ingo, 2014. "Insiderhandel und die Regulierung der Kapitalmärkte: Ein Beitrag zur MiFID-Debatte," Discussion Papers 2014-7, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.

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