Misrepresentation of utilities in bargaining: pure exchange and public good economies
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- Kibris, Ozgur, 2002. "Misrepresentation of Utilities in Bargaining: Pure Exchange and Public Good Economies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 91-110, April.
References listed on IDEAS
- Roth, Alvin E, 1985. "A Note on Risk Aversion in a Perfect Equilibrium Model of Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 207-211, January.
- Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-518, May.
- Nielsen, Lars Tyge, 1984. "Risk sensitivity in bargaining with more than two participants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 371-376, April.
- William Thomson, 1984. "The Manipulability of Resource Allocation Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(3), pages 447-460.
- Harrington, Joseph Jr., 1986. "A non-cooperative bargaining game with risk averse players and an uncertain finite horizon," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 9-13.
- Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
- Kannai, Yakar, 1977. "Concavifiability and constructions of concave utility functions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 1-56, March.
- Sobel, Joel, 1981. "Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(3), pages 597-619, May.
- Thomson, William, 1988. "The Manipulability of the Shapley-Value," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 17(2), pages 101-127.
- Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
- Crawford, Vincent P. & Varian, Hal R., 1979. "Distortion of preferences and the Nash theory of bargaining," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 203-206.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Fujinaka, Yuji & Wakayama, Takuma, 2015. "Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 165-185.
- Gomez, Juan Camilo, 2006. "Achieving efficiency with manipulative bargainers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 254-263, November.
- Velez, Rodrigo A., 2011. "Are incentives against economic justice?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 326-345, January.
- Velez, Rodrigo A. & Thomson, William, 2012. "Let them cheat!," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 948-963.
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