Manipulation of Preferences and Relative Utilitarianism
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- Omer F. Baris, 2018. "Timing effect in bargaining and ex ante efficiency of the relative utilitarian solution," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 84(4), pages 547-556, June.
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- Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2016. "Egalitarian–utilitarian bounds in Nash’s bargaining problem," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 80(3), pages 427-442, March.
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Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(1), pages 79-92, January.
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- Pivato, Marcus, 2006. "Approximate implementation of Relative Utilitarianism via Groves-Clarke pivotal voting with virtual money," MPRA Paper 627, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Claus-Jochen Haake & Cheng-Zhong Qin, 2018. "On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem," Working Papers CIE 113, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
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- Velez, Rodrigo A. & Thomson, William, 2012. "Let them cheat!," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 948-963.
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