Delegation and Threat in Bargaining
No abstract is available for this item.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1995.
"Double-edged incentives: Institutions and policy coordination,"
Handbook of International Economics,
in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 38, pages 1973-2030
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1995. "Double-Edged Incentives: Institutions and Policy Coordination," CEPR Discussion Papers 1141, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
- Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(3), pages 607-37, May.
- Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
- Dolado, Juan J. & Griffiths, Mark & Padilla, Atilano Jorge, 1993.
"Delegation in International Monetary Policy Games,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
761, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Chaim Fershtman & Kenneth L. Judd & Ehud Kalai, 1990.
"Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation,"
879, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L & Kalai, Ehud, 1991. "Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(3), pages 551-59, August.
- Crawford, Vincent P. & Varian, Hal R., 1979. "Distortion of preferences and the Nash theory of bargaining," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 203-206.
- Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987.
"Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-40, December.
- Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
- Jones, Stephen R. G., 1989. "Have your lawyer call my lawyer : Bilateral delegation in bargaining situations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 159-174, March.
- Katz, Michael L., 1991.
"Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments,"
Department of Economics, Working Paper Series
qt79b870w0, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Michael L. Katz, 1991. "Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(3), pages 307-328, Autumn.
- Michael L. Katz., 1991. "Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments," Economics Working Papers 91-172, University of California at Berkeley.
- Szymanski, Stefan, 1994. "Strategic delegation with endogenous costs : A duopoly with wage bargaining," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 105-116, March.
- Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-47, Supplemen.
- Muthoo, Abhinay, 1996.
"A Bargaining Model Based on the Commitment Tactic,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 134-152, April.
- Motty Perry & Larry Samuelson, 1994.
"Open- versus Closed-Door Negotiations,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(2), pages 348-359, Summer.
- Sobel, Joel, 1981. "Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(3), pages 597-619, May.
- Burtraw, Dallas, 1992. "Strategic delegation in bargaining," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 181-185, February.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:23:y:1998:i:2:p:266-283. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.