Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
The role of commitments in noncooperative games is well acknowledged and documented. One way to achieve commitments is by letting delegates represent the players of a game. In this paper, the authors study a delegation game in which the players can use agents strategically to play on their behalf and the contracts they sign with them are common knowledge. They show that, in such cases, every Pareto optimal outcome of the game can become the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the delegation game. The authors demonstrate this result by discussing the Cournot-type duopolistic game. Copyright 1991 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 32 (1991)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297|
Phone: (215) 898-8487
Fax: (215) 573-2057
Web page: http://www.econ.upenn.edu/ier
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0020-6598 Email: |
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:32:y:1991:i:3:p:551-59. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.