In a framework of preferences over lotteries, we show that an axiom system consisting of weakned versions of Arrow’s axioms has a unique solution. “Relative Utilitarianism” consists of first normalizing individual von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities between 0 and 1 and then summing them.
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|Note:||In : Econometrica, 67(3), 417-498, 1999|
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