In a framework of preferences over lotteries, we show that an axiom system consisting of weakned versions of Arrowâ€™s axioms has a unique solution. â€œRelative Utilitarianismâ€ consists of first normalizing individual von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities between 0 and 1 and then summing them.
|Date of creation:||01 Dec 1993|
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