Approximate implementation of Relative Utilitarianism via Groves-Clarke pivotal voting with virtual money
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More about this item
KeywordsRelative Utilitarianism; Groves-Clarke; pivotal mechanism; demand-revealing mechanism; voting dollars; point voting;
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-11-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2006-11-12 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2006-11-12 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-UPT-2006-11-12 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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