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William Vickrey: A Pioneer in the Economics of Incentives

Author

Listed:
  • Laffont, Jean-Jacques

    (Universite de Toulouse)

Abstract

Prize Lecture, December 27, 1996

Suggested Citation

  • Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1996. "William Vickrey: A Pioneer in the Economics of Incentives," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 1996-2, Nobel Prize Committee.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:nobelp:1996_002
    as

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    File URL: http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1996/vickrey-lecture.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
    2. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
    3. Jacob Marschak, 1959. "Remarks on the Economics of Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 70, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    4. Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
    5. John C. Harsanyi, 1955. "Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63(4), pages 309-309.
    6. Groves, Theodore & Loeb, Martin, 1975. "Incentives and public inputs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 211-226, August.
    7. J. A. Mirrlees, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(2), pages 175-208.
    8. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    9. J. Marschak, 1955. "Elements for a Theory of Teams," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 1(2), pages 127-137, January.
    10. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    11. I. D. Hill, 1960. "The Economic Incentive Provided by Sampling Inspection," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series C, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 9(2), pages 69-81, June.
    12. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-631, July.
    13. William Vickrey, 1960. "Utility, Strategy, and Social Decision Rules," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 74(4), pages 507-535.
    14. P. Whittle, 1954. "Optimum Preventative Sampling," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 2(2), pages 197-203, May.
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    2. de Palma, André & Lindsey, Robin & Proost, Stef, 2007. "Chapter 1 Investment and the use of tax and toll revenues in the transport sector: The research agenda," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 1-26, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Asymmetric information;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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